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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Agger, Christie and Pinner (Christie, 1970a) laid the theoretical 
foundation for the investigation of the effective social manipulator 
whom they christened the "Machiavellian." Their real life models for 
the Machiavellian were senior social scientists at the Stanford Center 
for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences. These individuals 
appeared to exercise considerable influence over the lives of their 
fellow social scientists in terms of the distribution of funds and 
positions. The Machiavellian concept was intended to encompass indi-
viduals - within and outside the professions - who are markedly effect~ 
ive in the exercise of social influence in their interpersonal relation-
ships. 
The Machiavellian concept appears to possess relevance for both 
the personality theorist and social psychologist. The personality 
theorist is promised a potentially valuable classification schema for 
personality. While theorists have expressed interest in the attitudes 
and interpersonal behaviors encompassed by the Machiavellian concept 
for decades, their interest was on a piecemeal basis and a classific-
ation schema dealing exclusively with Machiavellian attitudes and be~ 
havior has not been previously advanced. Now that a Machiavellian 
classification schema has been proposed, personality theorists may 
sumbit it to empirical investigation so that its usefulness in concept-
1 
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ualizing human personality may be tested. 
The Machiavellian concept also possesses considerable relevance 
for the social psychologist since it concerns the exercise of inter-
personal influence which is a central problem for the discipline. In-
truiging questions concerning the operation of social influence process-
es may be generated by treating the Machiavellian as both a source and 
target of influence attempts. Identification of the Machiavellian as 
an influence source raises questions concerning the conditions in which 
he attempts to influence others and in which his attrrepts are successful. 
Designation of the Machiavellian as a target of influence provokes ques-
tions concerning the circumstances in which the Machiavellian resists 
or complies with the influence attempts of others. The empirical in-
vestigation of these questions promises to extend the social psycholog-
ist's understanding of the mechanics of interpersonal influence as well 
as help the personality psychologist establish an empirical foundation 
for the Machiavellian personality 
The Machiavellian of The Prince 
The term, Machiavellian, was appropriated from the English language 
in which it designates individuals who adhere to the strategies of pol-
itical manipulation advocated in Niccolo Machiavelli's The Prince (The 
Random ~ouse Dictionary of~ English Language, 1966). Publication of 
~Prince made Machiavelli's name a synonym for opportunism and decit 
because of its negative description of human nature and pragmatic dis-
cussion of the necessities of statecraft (Russell, 1945). A description 
of the historical context in which ~ Prince was written and an exam-
ination of Machiavelli's philosophy concerning the rtature of man and 
realities of state craft will be undertaken to provide both an historical 
and philosophical perspective of the Machiavellian. 
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~ Prince must be understood within the context of the political 
upheavals of the Italian Renaissance. Fifteenth-century Italy witnes-
sed a succession of illegitimate regimes which were established through 
political corruption. French and Spanish invaders divided the Italian 
state between themselves. The first French invasion in 1494 drove out 
the ruling Medici and established a republic. In 1498, one year prior 
to the second French invasion, Machiavelli was appointed Secretary to 
the Florentine republic. In this position, Machiavelli gained the 
wealth of political experience from which he would later fashion The 
Prince. In the service of the republic, he completed several important 
diplomatic missions to areas under Florentine control and foreign 
states. In 1512, the Medici were returned to power and the French in-
vaders were expelled. Machiavelli., long an opponent of the Medici, lost 
his government post and was exiled to the countryside after a short 
period of imprisonment (Butterfield, 1956). 
The Prince was written in 1513 during Machiavelli 1 s exile at San 
Casciano near Florence (Milligan, 1953). The treatise was designed to 
win him recognition as a potential adviser to the Medici regime and to 
persuade Prince Lorenzo De Medici to unite the Italian state following 
Machiavelli's principles of statecraft. While there is a current dis-
pute among historians as to whether the Prince of the Medici ever re~ 
ceived The Prince, it is clear that neither of Machiavelli's objectives 
were realized (Anglo, 1969). 
Machiavelli intended to prove his worth as an adviser by demonstr~ 
ating how a new prince could consolidate his control over new princip-
a li.ties. This was the problem which immediately concerned the new 
Prince of the Medici. Machiavelli contended that the principles of 
effective state craft could be derived from a careful examination 
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of both ancient and contemporary regimes. Two important theses under-
pinned Machiavelli's historical method: imitation and historical re-
currence. The thesis of imitation held that the great leaders of the 
past should be imitated to gain their virtues (Butterfield, 1956). In 
Chapter 6 of The Prince Machiavelli stated: 
Let no man marvaile, if in the discourse I shall make of new 
Principalities, both touching a Prince, and touching a state, 
I shall alleage very famous examples: for seeing men almost 
alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others, and proceed in 
their actions by imitation, and being that others wayes cannot 
be exactly follow'd, nor their vertues, whose patterne thou 
set' st before thee attain'd unto; a wise man ought alwayes to 
tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons, and imitate those 
that have been the most excellent: to the end that if his vertue 
arrive not thereto, at least it may yeeld some savour thereof 
(p. 20). 
The thesis of historical recurrence held that history consists 
of repeating patterns. ·Machiavelli held that human nature, especially 
man's passions drive men to commit the same actions in all ages caus-
ing the repetition of patterns of events. Given that events occur in a 
finite number of patterns, knowledge of these patterns from the study 
of ancient and contemporary regimes would permit the derivation of true 
laws of history relevant to all ages. From such laws, timeless princip-
les of statecraft could be developed· to counsel princes (Butterfield, 
1956). Machiavelli commented in book 3 of The Discourses: 
Wise men say (and perhaps not unjustly) that in order to form 
an impression of what is yet to come, we ought to consider 
what is already passed; for there is nothing in this world 
at present, or at any other time, but has and will have its 
counterpart in antiquity; which happens because these things 
are operated by human beings who, having the same passions 
in all ages, must necessarily behave uniformly in similar 
situations (p. 203). 
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The Prince represents an attempt to explicate the timeless prin-
ciples of statecraft Machiavelli derived from his own examination of 
ancient and contemporary regimes. He exhorted the Prince of the Medici 
that through skillful implementation of these principles the Medici's 
rule over Florence could be consolidated and the entire state of Italy 
could be united. Despite Machiavelli's dedication of his treaties to 
Prince Lorenzo de Medici and attempted intercession in Machiavelli's 
behalf by his friends, his worth as an adviser went unrecognized along 
with his dream of a united Italy within his lifetime. Since Machiavelli 
possessed no occupational experience outside of government service, he 
devoted his remaining years to writing treaties concerning political 
philosophy (Anglo, 1969). 
Machiavelli is unique among power theorists in his explicit 
discussion of his assumptions about human nature (Christie, 1970a). 
The realpplitik. of~ Prince is predicated on Machiavelli's belief 
that men are prisoners of their irrational passions and are incapable 
of self-government (Jones, 1969). In Chapter 17 of The Prince, 
Machiavelli discussed the flaws he found in men: 
For touching men, wee may say this in general, they are un-
thankful, unconstant, dissemblers, they avoyd dangers, and are 
covetous of gaine; and whilst thou doest them good, they are 
wholly thine; their blood, their fortunes, lives and children 
are at thy service, as is said before, when the danger is 
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remote; bu't when it approaches, they revolt. And that Prince; 
who wholly relyes upon their·words, unfurnished of all other 
preparations goes to wrack: for the friendships that are 
gotten with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth 
of the mind, are dearely bougb,Liri.deed; but they will neither 
keep long, nor serve well in time of need: and men doe lesse 
regard to offend one that is supported by love, than by feare. 
(pp. 62-63). 
Machiavelli held that chief among man's irrational passions is 
ambition. Subsidiary motivations include fear, envy, greed, hatred of 
restrictions on activities and security. Machiavelli believed that 
these assumptions about human nature possess universal validity since 
he assumed that human nature remains constant throughout history. 
Machiavelli contended that man's passions must inevitably produce 
conflict among individuals within society. The certainty of conflict 
rendered self-government an impossibility. Machiavelli believed that 
the remedy to inevitable human conflict lay in the establishment of a 
strong monarchy which could constrain its sub;jects through the instrum-
ents of force and propaganda (Jones, 1969). In volume 1 of~ 
Discourses, Machiavelli argued: 
It is vain to look for anything good from those-countries which 
we. see 'npwadays so:·i::o+rupt7 .. as. is the case above all others 
with Italy. France and Spain also have their share of corrupt-
ion, and if we do not see so many disorders and troubles in 
those countries as is the case daily in Italy, it is not so 
much owing to the goodness of their people, in which they are 
greatly deficient, as to the fact that they have each a king 
who keeps them united, not only by his virtue, but also by 
his virtue, but also by the institutions of those king-
doms, which are as yet preserved pure (pp. 209-211). 
Machiavelli faced the problem that the monarch is also a man pos-
sessed of mankin~'s weaknesses. This p~oblem was conceded. He observed 
that the private interests of princes often conflicted with those of 
his subjects and that most princes were tryants. Tyranny in itself did 
not concern Machiavelli. His concern was whether the prince acquired 
and maintained power. The virtuous prince cultivated power, while the 
prince who lacked virtue eroded the power of his regime. Machiavelli's 
concept of virtue was quite different from traditional usage of the 
term. For Machiavelli, the.effective use of power was a prince's chief 
virtue. The ideal monarch was one who successfully manipulated his 
subjects' passions to his own advantage. 
Machiavelli cautioned that the virtuous prince cannot adhere to 
the traditional Christian values .such as faith and honesty. In a world 
of ambitious men, the monarch must ruthlessly deal with his subjects to 
consolidate and extend his power or else become a victim himself (Jones, 
1969). This advice is concisely expressed in Chapter 18 of The Prince: 
A Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot observe all those 
things, for which men. are held good; he being often fore' d, for 
the maintenance of his State, to do contrary to his fait~, 
charity, humanity, and religion: and therefore it behooves him 
to have a mind so disposed as to turne and take advantage of 
all winds and· fortunes; and as i"ormerly I said, not forsake 
the good, while he can; but to know how to make use of the evill 
upon necessity (p. 67). 
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The instruments of the virtuous prince are force and progaganda. 
Force must be exercised ruthlessly. In Chapter 5 of The Prince, 
Machiavelli advised: 
Whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free, and dis-
mantells it not; let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it: 
for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty 
for refuge, and the ancient orders it had; which neither by 
length of time, nor any favours afforded them, are ever 
forgotten (p. 19). 
In Chapter 8 of The Prince, Machiavelli warned: 
It is to be noted, that in the laying hold of a State, the 
usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruel-
ties at once, that hee bee not forced often to return to them, 
and that hee may be able, by not renewing of them, to give 
men some security, and gaine their affections by doing them 
some courtesies. Hee that carries it otherwise, ~ither for 
fearfullnesse, or upon evill·advice, is alwayes constraind 
to hold his sword drawne in his hand; nor ever can hee rely 
upon his subjects, tbere being no possibility for them, be-
cause of his daily and continual! injuries, to live in any 
safety: for his injuries should bee done altogether, that 
being seldomer tasted, they might lesse offend: his favours 
should bee bestowed by little and little, to the end they 
might keep their taste the better (pp •. 35-36). 
The recommendations made in Chapters 5 and 8 of The Prince are 
unmistakenly ruthless. Policies such as the destruction of a free 
city or the perpetration of all the prince's cruelties at once are not 
calculated to cultivate his subjects' love. To the contrary, the 
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prince who follows Machd.avelli.1!S suggestions will evoke fear in his 
subjects. This outcome did not perplex Machiavelli. He believed that 
given the choice between the two outcomes of love and fear, it is 
better for the prince to be feared. In Chapter 17 of The Prince he 
concluded: 
From hence arises a dispute, whether it is bettered to be 
belov'd or feard: I answer, a man would wish hee might bee 
the one and the other: but because hardly can they subsist 
both together, it is much safer to be feard, than be lov'd; 
being that one of the two must needs faile (p. 62). 
The second major instrument of the virtuous prince is propaganda. 
While the prince cannot afford to exercise the traditional Christian 
virtues such as faith and honesty, he can strengthen his rule by 
appearing to be virtuous. Machiavelli's advice to the prince to 
manage the impressions of his subjects is contained in Chapter 18 
of The Prince: 
How commendable in a Prince it is to keepe his word, and 
live with integrity, not making us'e of cunning and subtlety, 
every one knows well: yet wee see by experience in these our 
dayes, that those Princes have effected great matters, who 
have made small reckoning of keep'ing their words, and have 
known by their craft to turne and wind men about, and in 
the end have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth 
(p. 65). 
Therefore is there no necessity for a Prince to be enduded 
with all these above written qualities; but it behooves well 
that he seeme to be so; or rather I will boldly say this, 
that having these qualities and alwayes regulating himselfe 
by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they 
are advantageous; as to seeme pitifull, faithfull, mild, 
religious, and of integrity (pp. 66-67). 
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The virtuous prince consolidates and increases his power through 
the ruthless application of the instruments of force and propaganda. 
Traditional Christian morality was eschewed as a liability to the 
prince. In the corrupt environment of fifteenth-century Italy, power 
was held to be the only good. Traditional Christian values were only 
relevant if the appearance of their possession could promote the 
prince's rule. 
If power was Machiavelli's only good, what was the ultimate value 
of power? Machiavelli appears to have justified the acquisition of 
power on two related grounds. First, power enables the prince to 
establish order in the state. Since Machiavelli believed that mens' 
passions must inevitably produce conflict and the threat of anarchy, 
he contended that a powerful monarch was required to constrain the 
subjects from producing disorder. Second, power serves the private 
objectives of the princ;e •. The prince requires power to pursue his 
personal interests whether they be the expansion of his realm (Machiav-
elli championed a united Italy) or the acquisition of greater wealth. 
In paying tribute t.o the private interests of monarchs, Machiavelli 
attempted to appear to be a faithful servant to the Prince of the 
Medici. This attempted impression management was consistent with the 
overall intent of The Prince which was to win Machiavelli a position 
as adviser to the Medici regime (Butterfield,. 1956). 
The Prince possesses important implications for both Western 
philosophy and the discipline of psychology. The remarkable contri~ 
bution of this treatise to Western philosophy lies in its realpolitik. 
Breaking with a philosophical tradition which idealized human nature, 
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the state and the good, Machiavelli attempted to describe men, their 
governments and objectives as he believed they existed in fifteenth-
century Italy. Machiavelli provided an unflattering commentary on 
man's nature. He assumed that men are stupid and dominated by irrat-
ional passions such as ambition instead of reason. Men were held to 
be incapable of self-government since their passions must inevitably 
result in conflict and anarcpy. Machiavelli believed that civil order 
could only be achieved through the imposition of a strong monarchy. 
Machiavelli's discussion of the art of statecraft was equally 
devoid of idealism. He contended that in.a world of "mischievous men," 
the prince must ruthlessly manipulate his subjects' passions to achieve 
power. The prince's ch~f' instruments of statecraft are force and 
propaganda. The Prince provides several concrete examples of how these 
instruments may be effectively employed. The practice of Christian 
virtues was alien to Machiavelli's statecraft. Morality in government 
was judged to be a liability to the prince who lived in a world pop-
ulated by "mischievous men.'' Instead of practicing Christian virtues, 
the prince should use the tool of propaganda to make himself appear 
virtuous to his subjects. 
Machiavelli chose power as his good ia,stead of a traditfonal end 
such as justice. This conception of good derived from his belief 
that all men sought power. Within his perspective, the virtuous prince 
consolidates and expands his power. The acts by which this accompl-
ished are the prince's virtues. In contrast, the prince without virtue 
erodes the power of his regime. The acts which undermine his power con-
stitute his vices. 
Machiavelli believed that the acquisition and exercise of power 
is ultimately justified by its service to the prince. Power enables 
12 
.l.• 
the prince to establish civil order which benefits the public welfare 
and the prince's security. Power also facilitates the prince's private 
interests whether they include the annexation of territory or the ac-
quisition of wealth. 
The main contributions of The Prince to psychology include its 
motivational model of man, early description of the Machiavellian 
personality, assumption of inevitable conflict among men and discussion 
of the exercise of social influence. Machiavelli was not the first 
philosopher to claim that men were driven by diverse motives. The 
motivational model of man presented in The.Prince is unique by virtue 
of the motives it holds to be most influential in human behavior. 
Since he assumed that all men seek power, ambition was identified as 
man 1 s chief motive. This position anticipated Adler 1 s (1930) "will to 
power" which was postulated during the intermediate stage of his career. 
Adler, at this stage of his the6lrizing, held that man's aggressive 
drive is the most impqrtant determinant of h\lman behavior. Behavior 
characterized by the "will to power" was described as self-centered 
to the exclusion of the.interests of.others. The virtuous prince and 
Adler's man dominated by the ''will to power" appear to be remarkably 
similar individuals. 
While ambition was identified as man's chief motive, Machiavelli 
postulated secondary motives of fear, envy, greed, hatred of restrict-
ions on activities and security. Machiavelli anticipated Brehmvs 
(1966) theory of reactance when he observed that men are often driven 
out of hatred against imposed restrictions on their freedom. Reactance 
theory predicts that when freedom of choice is threatened or lost, an 
individual will act to reestablish that freedom. Machiavelli also an-
ticipated Maslow's (1955) "survival tendency" when he identified 
13 
security as a motive for human behavior. For Maslow, the "survival 
tendency" represents man's drive to satisfy needs which are crucial 
to biological and psychological survival. This seems to be equivalent 
to providing Machiavelli's security. Whereas Maslow held that this 
tendency is prepotent over all other drives, Machiavelli emphasized 
man 1 s ambition. 
Machiavelli's discussion of the virtuous monarch in~ Prince 
provides an early description of the Machiavellian personality or 
Machiavellian. The Machiavellian who emerges from the treaties is 
characterized by rationality, amorality and manipulativeness. He 
ruthlessly exploits others in the pursuit of power" He is a master in 
the manipulation of others' passions. Later, it will be domonstrated 
that the Machiavellian described in The Prince anticipated Freud's 
oral character (Maddi, 1972), Fromm's (1947) exploitative orientationj 
and Agger, Christie and Pinners' (Christie, 1970a) Machiavellian 
personality. 
An important assumptionof The Prince is that men driven by diverse 
passions inevitably come into conflict with each other necessitating the 
imposition of order by a powerful monarch. This assumption anticipates 
.Freud's (1952) discussion of instinctual gratification and the role of 
the superego. Like Machiavelli, Freud believed that human instincts 
are inevitably antagonistic to an ordered society. Whereas Machiavelli 
held that a power monarch capable of mediating punishments is necessary 
for the imposition of order, Freud believed that the social order is 
achieved through the operation of the superego. Freud contended that 
instinctual gratification is constrained through the operation of the 
superego" The superego was conceptualized as a part of the ego which 
represents societal rules and regulations. The superego, like 
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Machiavelli's powerful monarch, constrains instinctual gratification 
thl!'ough the use of punishment. Whenever instinctual gratification is 
contemplated which would violate the superego's internalized values, 
the organism experiences the uncomfortable increase of tension which 
Freud termed guilt. The punishing effects of guilt force the organism 
to seek forms of instinctual gratification which are more acceptable to 
society. Thus, ~Prince remarkably parallels Freud's treatment of 
the problem of socialization. 
The final contribution of The Prince to psychology lies in Mach-
iavelli's discussion of the· exercise· of social influence. Machiavelli 
maintained that a prince possesses two main instruments of social in~ 
fluence: force and propaganda. He believed that force should be ruth~ 
lessly employed as it is better for a monarch to be feared than to be 
loved. Machiavelli's preference for the use of punishment in the con~ 
trol of human behavior runs counter to the findings of current operant 
conditioning research'! Punishment alone has been found to merely sup-
press behavior. Techniques· which use reward have been proved to be 
highly effective in shaping and maintaining desired behavior, while 
techniques which combine elements of reward and punishment have been 
found to be successful in extinguishing deviant behavior and simultan-
eously strengthening prosocial behavior (Hilgrad & Bower, 1975). 
The Prince's second instrument of .social influence is propaganda. 
Machiavelli anticipated impression management theoriest when he.advised 
the prince to use the tool of propaganda to appear conventionally vir-
tuous. Recent impression management theoriests like Helm (Note 1) 
seem to agree with Machiavelli that the active control of others' 
impressions of oneself can be a potent tool of social influence. ·There 
is dramatic evidence that American politicans have heeded Machiavelli's 
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advice in campaign advertisements which·associate the candidates with 
God and Americanism. 
Machiavelli's recommendation that the prince employ propaganda to 
appear vitruous also seems to anticipate Hollander's (1961) concept of 
"idiosyncrasy credit." Where Machiavelli argued that a virtuous appear= 
ance strengthens a prince's rule, Hollander proposed that a group lead-
er's appearing to conform to group norms strengthens his status within 
·the group and facilitates his introduction of innovations to the group. 
In both Machiavelli and Holanders' speculation, the.appearance of ad= 
hering to relevant norms leads to the·enhancement of the leader's 
power. 
The Machiavellian of ~ Prince has now been examined within an 
historical and philosophical perspective. He is the virtuous monarch 
·who cunningly manipulatei;; his subjects' passions in the pursuit of 
power. The implications of The Prince for Western philosophy and 
psychology have been considered in order to assess the·contribution of 
the Machiavellian concept to human thought. In the discussion that 
follows, the relevance of the Machiavellian concept for contemporary 
theories of personality will be examined in order to demonstrate that 
it is an important concept deserving empirical investigation. 
The·Machiave'.tlian·in Personality Theory 
The Machiavellian of~ Prince was characterized by rationality, 
amorality and manipulativeness. This fifteenth-century description of 
the virtuous prince provided an early conceptualization of a Machiavel= 
lian personality. The Machiavellian of The Prince finds his counter= 
part in Freud 1 s·.,Q\.ral character (Maddi, 1972), Fromm us (194 7) exploit= 
\ 
·ative orientation and Agger, Christie and Pinners 1 Machiavellian per= 
sonality .(~hristie, 1970a). These schemas for classifying personality 
16 
will be reviewed in an effort to demonstrate the pivotal role of the 
Machiavellian concept in modern personality theory and thus, its im-
portance as a topic for empirical investigation. 
Freud's oral· character may be 'described·· in terms of its dominant 
conflict and central traits. The main conflict of the oral stage of 
development involves the oral activities of taking and receiving. The 
·child's selfish desire to take and receive nurturance from his parents 
is hypothesized to inevitably clash with the parents' own requirements. 
If the parents provide the optimum·attention to the child 1 s instinctual 
oral needs, F•:eud believed that conflict will .. be minimized and the child 
can progress to the anal stage of development. But, should the parents 
afford eitherinadequate or excessive attention to the childus needs, 
the basic conflict will be intensified and the· child 1 s psychosexual 
growth will be arrested at the oral stage. Fixation of development·. at 
this stage results in~ characteristic pattern of traits which· are 
attitudes about the world and oneself (Maddi,. 1972). 
The traits atttibuted to the oral character are bipolar in nature. 
Individuals may vacill.ate between the extremes of each dimension. 
These traits reflect attitudes concerning the world as a source of 
nurturance and one 1 s ability to achieve satisfaction. The central 
traits of the oral character include·optimism-pessimism, gullibility-
suspiciousness, manipulativeness=passivity,.admiration-envy, and cocki= 
ness=self=belittlement. Maddi (1972) described the oral character 0 s 
traits in the following manner: 
Optimism, pessimism and admiration are unrealistic estimates 
of the likelihood of being nurtured by otherpeople •. In man= 
ipulativeness and passivity, we see unconstructive·tendencies 
to wrest satisfaction from the·world or lie back and wait until 
it falls into one's mouth. Cockiness indicates an unrealistic= 
ally affluent sense of one's own resources, whereas envy and 
self-belittlement indicate quite the opposite (p. 272). 
There are important parallels between the Machiavellian and Freud's 
oral character. The Machiavellian 1 s central conflict surrounds the acg 
quisition of power which seems analogous to the child's pursuit of nur= 
turance. The Machiavellian, like the oral character, may be particular-
ly characterized by the single poles of pessimism, suspiciousness and 
manipulativeness. The Machiavellian is pessimistic about the likeli= 
hood of acquiring power over others since power is a scarce commodity 
which is not easily won or held. The Machiavellian is suspicious of 
others since he believes that men are basically"evil. Finally, he is 
manipulative of others because he believes that: power can only be 
acquired through cunning. Men do not willingly grant others power over 
them. 
Fromm's (1947) approach to the description of personality reflects 
Freud's influence in its assumptions that traits motivate human behavior 
and that an individual's orientation in life is made up of a cluster of 
traits. Fromm postulated that the exploitative orientation derives from 
the child's learning experiences as the dominant partner·of .a symbiotic 
relationship with his parents. In this relationship, neither the child 
nor the parents attain independence· or individuality. The· child learns 
that what is valued lies outside of himself and that these things must 
.... , ... "~ .•... 
be seized or passively received from others. Fromm theorized that: 
The exploitative orientation, like the receptive, has as its 
basic premise the feeling that the source of all good is out= 
side, that whatever one wants to get must be sought there, and 
that one cannot produce anything oneself. The difference 
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between the two, however, is that the exploitative type does 
not expect to receive things from others as gifts, but to take 
them away from others by force or cunning. • • • In the realm 
of love and affection these people tend to grab and steal. 
They feel attracted only to people whom they can take away 
from somebody else •••• We find the same attitude with re= 
gard to thinking and intellectual pursuits. Such people will 
tend not to produce ideas but to steal them. • • • They use 
and exploit anybody and anything from whom or from which they 
can squeeze something ••• • This orientation seems to be 
symbolized by.the biting mouth which is often a prominent 
feature in such people (pp. 64-65). 
The traits attributed to the exploitative orientation are also bi= 
polar in nature. The poles in this typology represent positive and 
negative aspects of the traits. The main traits include active-ex= 
ploitative, able to take initiative-aggressive, able to make claims= 
egocentric, proud-conceited, impulsive=rash, self-confident-arrogant 
and captivating=seducing (Fromm, 1947). 
Useful parallels can be drawn between the Machiavellian and the 
individual characterized 'by the exploitative orientation. Central to 
the Machiavellian°s strivings is the premise of the exploitative orien= 
tation that what is valued lies outside of oneself and that it can best 
be obtained through predatory behavior. The Machiavellian shares with 
the individual characterized by the exploitative orientation the single 
traits of aggressiveness, exploitativeness, egocentricity and seduct= 
iveness. The Machiavellian's search for power depends upon aggressive 
behavior. He believes that power can only be acquired through the 
.active manipulation of others. The Machiavellian callously exploits 
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others in his pursuit of power. Their welfare is deemed unimportant 
beside his own self-interest. The Machiavellian is strongly egocentr= 
ic. His sole concern is the advancement of his personal interests. 
Finally, the Machiavellian is seductive in his relationships with others. 
He attempts to manipulate their passions to gain control over their be= 
havior. 
Agger, Christie and Pinner (Christie, 1970b) proposed that indiv= 
iduals may be located on a Machiavellian dimension which· represents the 
degree to which one agrees with Niccolo Machiavelli~s views concerning 
human nature, abstract morality and interpersonal tactics. Six char= 
acteristics are attributed to individuals rated high on this dimension 
who will be called Highs: 
(1) Emotional detachment in interpersonal relation~ips. Highs 
., 
restrict the depth of their emotional involvement with iJfluence tar= 
gets. This precludes the development of empathy with t~~se individuals 
which allows Highs to treat them as objects to be manipulated. Emotion= 
al detachment is attained by approaching interpe·:tsonal sitrnations con= 
nitively rather than emotionally. In their rational approach to social 
situations, only information relevant to the successful exercise of 
influence is salient to Highs. The human consequences of their man= 
ipulative acts~ such as the target's emabrrassment~ are unimportant as 
long as they do not affect the final outcome. 
(2) Lack of concern with conventional morality. Highs do not 
endorse-conventional Judeo-Christian morality. Since they view man as 
selfish and competitive~ the manipulation of others is justified as 
being essential to self=preservation. Highs' world=view is utilitar= 
ian rather than moral. Their concern is with what advances their man= 
i.pulation of others rather than with· what society sanctions. 
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(3) Emphasis on means rather than the ends of manipulation. Highs 
are more concerned about the choice of interpersonal tactics than with 
the outcomes of manipulation. For Highs, the reward lies in the man= 
ipulative act itself. The outcome of the manipulative act possesses 
secondary importance to them. In the political arena~ Highsu emphasis 
on the means of manipulation causes them to place choice of tactics 
ahead of the ultimate ideological purposes for which the·tactics are 
selected. Highs inhabit the entire ideological spectrum. 
(4) Absence of gross psychopathology. Highs 1 effectiveness as 
manipulators requires that they possess an undistorted perception of 
their social environment and an unimpaired capacity for the planning and 
execution of manipulative attempts. Effective manipulation necessit= 
ates a minimal level of mental health. 
(5) Effective manipulation of others. Highs attempt more manip= 
ulations and achieve more success in the manipulation of others than 
individuals rated low on the Machiavellian dimension (who will be called 
Lows) when three conditions are present. Christie (1970c) outlined 
these conditions: 
Florence Geis and I have since analyzed some 50 laboratory 
studies and have found three parameters that determine whether 
Machiavellianism is salient.· High Machs make out better when 
three·crucial conditions are·niet: 1) ·when laboratory inter= 
action is fact=to-face with another person; 2) when t'here is 
latitude for improvisation, i.e., the subject has a chance to 
respond freely and is not restricted to pushing buttons o:r: 
taking tests; 3) when the situation permits the arousal of 
emotions, Le., where the· experimentr has serious consequences. 
Playing for money rather than~ say, points~ is an example (p.85). 
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Highs appear to be more successful in manipulation. than Lows because 
their emotional detachment and amorality allow them to intimidate op~ 
ponents through calculated harrassment. 
(6) Extreme resistance to social influenc.e. Highs u emotforaal 
detachment and suspiciousness of others renders them extremely nesist= 
ant to social influence. Highs' emotional detachment means that they 
are indifferent to how others feel about their actions. Highs are 
guided instead by a rational calculation of which tactics will ac.~ieve 
the selected outcome. Highs' suspiciousness causes them to qrnestion. 
others' intentions instead of attribution benevolence to them like 
Lows. This vigilanceincreases their·likelihood of detecting deception. 
While emotional detachment and suspiciousness render Highs resistant to 
social pressure, their rational orientation allows them to be influen= 
ced by rational argumentation. Geis and Christie (1970) observed: 
One consequence of the high Machsu lack of susceptibility to 
emotional involvements in general is a lack of susceptibility 
to sheer social pressure urging compliance, cooperation or 
attitude change - a characteristic which in turn accounts for 
their being no more likely than low Machs to be swayed by 
inducements to lie or cheat in most experiments. A second 
example of high Machs' resistance to social influence is 
their skepticism of experimenters 1 explanations and proced·ures) 
compared to lows' acceptance of the experimenterus definitions 
(p. 312). 
The Machiavelli.an of ~ Prince is closely related tOJ ttM:: Machiav= 
ellian personality which emerges from Aggerll Christie and Pinners 0 
speculation about Highs. These two conceptualizations of human person= 
ality share the elements of emotional detachment in interpersonal 
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relationships, lack of concern with conventional morality~ the absence 
of gross psychopathology, effectiveness in the manipulation of others 
and strong resistance to social influence. The characteristic which 
seems to separate the Machiavellian of The Prince from the Machiavel= 
lian personality is the latter's emphasis on the means rather than the 
ends of manipulation. Whereas the Machiavellian of ~ Prince manip= 
ulates in the pursuit of personal power, the Machiavellian personality 
manipulates for the sake of the manipulative act itself. He is more 
·concerned with the· choice of tactics than the outcomes from their im= 
plementation. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the outcome of his 
manipulations is increased interpersonal power. 
The Machiavellian of ~ Prince has now been examined within the 
context of modern personality theory. Parallels between the Machiavel= 
lian described in this treatise and the personality typologies of Freud, 
Fromm and Agger, Christie and Pinner suggest that these theoriests were 
describing similar kinds of interpersonal behavior and demonstrates the 
central role of the Machiavellian concept in personality theory. It is 
striking that these social behaviors have persisted over the four cen= 
turies that separate Machiavelli from contemporary personality theor= 
ists. This observation is certainly supportive of Machiavelli us claim 
that h':lman nature remains constant throughout history. 
Now that the important contribution of the Machiavellian concept 
to personality theory has been demonstratedll the empirical foundation 
for this concept may be examined. In what follows, the sc.ales designed 
to measure 8.n. individual 1 s standing on the Machiavellian dimeD.sion will 
be considered and studies demonstrating Highsu effectiveness in manip= 
ulation and resistance to social'influence will be reviewed. 
The Mach IV and Mach V Scales 
Niccolo Machiavelli's~ Prince and Disco~rses provided explicit 
statements concerning human nature, abstract morality and interpersonal 
tactics from which Agger, Christie and Pinner constructed scales to 
measure an individual 1 s standing on the Machiavellian dimensi.ono Sutic= 
cessive revision reduced an original set of 71 items to a 20 statement 
Mach IV scale (Mach is an abbreviation for Machiavellian) in whiich the 
items are placed in Likert format and counterbalanced for acqrniescence 
set. Subsequently, a forced~choice version of this scalei> designated 
Mach V, was constructed to control for social desirability. This scale 
also possesses 20 items. Each of its items contains three·statements: 
a Machiavellian statement, a non-Machiavellian statement of equivalent 
social desirability and a non~Machiavellian statement possessing an 
opposite degree of social desirability from the first two statements. 
The subject taking the Mach V scale is instructed to designate state= 
ments most like and least like himself, leaving the remaining statement 
I 
blank (Christie~ 1970b). 
The Mach IV and Mach V scales must be evaluated in terms of their 
internal consistency, item content and criterion validity. Their in= 
ternal consistency is acceptable. The split~half reliabilities for the 
Mach IV and Mach V scales are .79 and .69, respectively. Christle 
(1970c) explained that the Mach V scale 1 s·lower reliability is due to 
the elimination of a set for social desirability. This explanation is 
supported by Budner 1 s (1962) finding that the Mach IV scale is signific= 
antly related to the Edwards Scale of Social desirability,!.:: ~o35~ 
E <.OS, while the Mach V scale does not significantly correlate with 
this scale. 
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The content of the Mach IV and Mach V scales deals with topics 
central to the Machiavellian concept. Two factor analytic scales re= 
vealed that the scale items fall into three·content categories 
(Christie, 1970c): 
(1) Machiavellian tactics.· For example: "The best way to handle 
people is to tell them what they want to hear." 
(2) Negative description of human nature •. For example: uuMost 
men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their 
property." 
(3) Abstract morality. For example: 11People suffering from in= 
curable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death. 11 
The third test of the Machiavellianism scales is criterion validity. 
Agger, Christie and Pinner (Christie, 1970c) identified effective man= 
ipulation of others and extreme resistance to social influence as the 
Machiavellian personality's most important social behaviors. Empirical 
evidence which demonstrates that Highs are more effective than Lows in 
manipulating others and resisting social influence would support the 
Mach IV and Mach V scales' predictiveness of Machiavellian behavior. 
In what follows, studies which deal with these two problem areas will 
be reviewed to assess the· criterion validity of the two scales and the 
empirical foundation of the Machiavellian personality. 
'it 
Studies in Social Manipulation 
The effectiveness of Highs in manipulating others has been domon= 
strated in studies concerned with the offensive manipulation of others 
(Geis, Christie & Nelson, 1970) and bargaining within a triad (Geis~ 
1970; Christie & Geis, 1970a). In each of these studies, the three 
conditions postulated to be crucial to Highs' successful manipulation 
of others = face=to=fact interaction, latitude for improvisation and 
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affective arousal of influence targets - were present. Highs were 
found to be more effective manipulators than Lows in each situation. 
The investigation of offensive manipulation by Geis et al. (1970) 
will be considered first. In this paradigm~ subjects were instructed 
that they would complete a personality test and then administer (face= 
to-face) the same text to the next subject. Following completi(m of 
the initial test, it was disclosed that the student experimenter who 
had administered the test to them had perpetrated three minor decept= 
ions. Due to this alteration in procedure, subjects were told to ""use 
your power arbitrarily" (Geis et aL, 1970, p. 82) in subsequrend admin= 
istrations of the test. The three conditions believed crucial to Highs' 
success in manipulating others were clearly present in this paradigm. 
The test administration permitted face-to-face interaction, the subject 
administering the test was given permission to improvise and the inden= 
tification of the test as a personality test facilitated the arousal of 
emotions. 
Highs performed l'!l.ore manipl.lla:tions than Lows, overall. Highs also 
surpassed Lows in both variety and innovativeness of deception. Pre= 
determined categories of verbal and nonverbal behavior were used by 
observers to determine which behavior constituted a manipulation. 
Variety was defined by the number of categories used by the subject in 
administering the personality.test. Innovativeness was determined by 
the number of manipulations falling into categories outside those used 
in the initial testing of the subject by the student experimenter. 
Geis (1970) examined bargaining within a triad. Three s!Lllbjects ~ one 
High, Mid (a subject who scored in the middle~third on the Machiavel~ 
lianism scales) and Low, were observed within a bargaining~coalition 
game designed to elicit manipulative attempts and resistance to 
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manipulation. The game consisted of bargaining for shares of a total 
payoff of one hundred points per game. These points could be won ex= 
elusively by one player or divided in any fashion among two of the three 
players. A subject's total points over a series of games was used as 
an index of his ability to "manipulate his opponent relative to their 
ability to manipulate him" (Geis, 1970, p. 108). The three conditions 
postulated to be essential to Highs' success in manipulating others 
were also present in this paradigm. The pargaining was conducted in a 
fact-to-face manner, subjects had complete, freedom in their selection 
of manipulative tactics and the competition inherent in the game facil= 
itated the arousal of emotion. 
Highs outbargained Lows as reflected in their greater point totals. 
A strong positive correlation was found between a composite of the sub~ 
jects' Mach IV and Mach V scores and their total points, r = .71, 
E<·M· 
Christie and Geis (1970a) examined bargaining within a triad for 
money instead of points. Three subjects, one High, Mid and Low, were 
again placed around a table and instructed that they would bargain 
among themselves for the distribution of ten $1 bills. The game would 
end when any two players agreed to divide the money between themselves 
in any fashion to the exclusion of the third player. The dollars would 
then be given to the two players to take home according to their agre= 
emtne. Subjects from the Geis (1970) study of six months ago were used 
to insure that all subjects were equally familiar with the bargaining 
process and appropriate manipulative tactics. The triads were composed 
so that the subjects were unacquainted with each other. The three con= 
ditions believed to be central to Highs successful manipulation of 
others were present in this paradigm, since the main difference from the 
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previous study by Geis (1970) was that players bargained for dollars 
instead of points. Bargaining involved face-tomface interaction, sub= 
jects were free to choose their manipulative tactics and competition 
for money facilitated emotional arousal. Christie and Geis (1970a) 
speculated that the introduction of monetary stakes made the situation 
more salient to Lows, increasing their affective arousal, which pre= 
sumably interfered ¥ith their bargaining: 
High Machs would be little affected by an increase in ser= 
iousness. Lows would do less well in more serious situat= 
ions either because they are less willing to try to 
manipulate, or because their attention to ethical concerns 
interferes with bargaining effectiveness, or both (p. 169). 
Highs were substantially more successful than Lows in this paradigm 
as reflected in their greater cash totals. In each triad, Highs were 
members of the winning coalition which divided the money. Compared 
with their performance in the Geis (1970) paradigm in which they 
bargained for points, Highs were considerably more successful in 
bargaining for monetary stakes. This difference in performance would 
be expected if the shift to dollar stak~s increased Lows' affective in= 
volvement in the game impairing their effectiveness in bargaining. 
'I'he three studies (Geis, et al., 1970; Geis, 1970; Christie & 
Geis, 1970a) provided evidence that Highs are more effective manipu.l= 
ators than Lows in situations involving deception in test administrat= 
ion and bargaining within a triad for both points and dol.la:'.l:'s. The 
three conditions held to be essential to Highs' successful manipulatiioin 
of others were present in each of these paradigms. Moreove.r, the shift 
from points in the Geis (1970) paradigm to cash in the Christie and 
Geis (1970a) paradigm appears to have increased Highsu competitive 
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advantage over Lows by increasing their emotional involvement in the 
games. 
Christie (1970a) concluded that Highs' emotional detachment leads 
to the insensitive manipulation of their opponents which accounts for 
their success: 
· Geis and I have the impression that the High Machiavellian 
is an effective manipulator·1!2.E, because he reads the other. 
person and takes advantage of his weakness, but because his 
insensitivity to the other person permits him to bully his 
way through in pursuit of cooly rational goalso The Low 
Mach's empathic ability prevents him from being detached 
enough to take advantage of the other~ (p. 86). 
The criterion validity of the Mach IV and Mach V scales has been 
supported with respect to manipulative behavior. Furthermore, the 
reviewed studies revealed firm empirical support for the conceptual-
ization of a Machiavellian personality marked by effectiveness in the 
manipulation of others. The studies to be considered next deal with 
the pr1Dlblem of resistance to social influence. These studies will help 
determine whether the Machiavellianism scales are predictive of im= 
munity to the influence attempts of others and whether there is adequate 
impirical support for the postulation of a Machiavellian personality 
characterized by this kin:Q. of immunity. 
Studies of Resistance to Social Influence 
A series of studies dealing with resistance-to-implication (Exline, 
Thibaut, Hickey & Gumpert, 1970; Bogart, Geis, Levy & Zimbardo, 1970)~ 
partner influence on task performance (Harris, Note 2; Durkin~ 1970), 
attitude change (Geis, Krupat & Berger, Note 3; Epstein, 1969; Feiler, 
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Note 4) and the effect of negative feedback on self-description (Jones, 
Gergen & Davis, 1962) will be reviewed in search of evidence to support 
the thesis that Highs are extremely resistant to social influence. 
Geis and Christie (1970) predicated this thesis on empirical findings 
that revealed Highs to be emotionally detached and suspicious of others. 
Evidence of Highs' emotional detachment was furnished by the resist= 
ance-to ... implication study by Exline -et al. (1970). After Highs acquie-
sced to a confederate's cheating on an experimental task, they were in= 
terrogated by the experimenter. Highs maintained longer eye contact 
with the experimenter (while lying about their innocence) than did 
Lows and were measured by independent observers to have appeared less 
anxious than Lows during both baseline and interrogation periods. The 
data on duration of eye contact and emotional appearance support the 
inference that Highs were more·emotionally detached than Lows in this 
-paradigm. Geis and Christie (1970) speculated that Highs 1 emotional 
detachment means that they will be indifferent to what others think of 
their actions and will instead attend to information which will help 
them achieve their desired outcomes. 
Evidence that Highs are more suspicious of people than Lows was 
furnished by Christie, Gergen and Marlowe (1970). In this study" Highs 
and Lows participated in a two.-man, nonzero sum game in which they com0 
peted against an unseem player whose choices were preprogrammed to be 
identical for each subject. Following the game, subjects were asked to 
rate their unseen opponent on a trustworthiness dimension. Highs rated 
this individual as bed.ng significantly less trustworthy than did Lows. 
This finding supports the-inference that Highs were more suspiciollls of 
their partner in this paradigm than were Lows and- is consistent with 
evidence from Harris (Note 2) that Highs have a negative view of people 
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in general. Geis and Christie (1970) hypothesized that Highs' suspic= 
iousness of others leaves them more vigilant than Lows against others 1 
attempts to influence them and thereby reduces their susceptibility to 
social influence. 
Now that the theoretical groundwork for the thesis that Highs are 
extremely resistant to social influence has been examined along with 
supporting evidence, the studies designed to directly test this thesis 
can be examined. 1he resistance-to-implication studies by Exline et al. 
(1970) and Bogart et al. (1970) will be considered first. Exline et al. 
(1970) assigned a subject and a confederate to perform an experimental 
task. During the task, the experimenter left the room to take a long 
distance phone call and the confederate proceeded to implicate the sub-
ject in cheating by locating the answers to the experimental problems, 
writing them down on the scrap paper both were using and reciting these 
answers out loud. Following completion of the task, the experimenter 
interviewed both partners concerning the problem-solving methods they 
had employed, gradually showing increased suspicion until he accused 
them of cheating and attempted to extract a confession. 
Highs acq·uiesced to the confederate 1 s cheating to the same degree 
as Lows - as measured by not immediately informing the experimenter of 
the cheating~ restraining the partner from cheating or asking to with= 
draw from the experiment - although independent observers concluded that 
Highs resisted the confederate's implication attempts more vigorously 
than Lows throughout the period assigned to the task. Two operational 
measures of resistance to social influence were duration of eye contact 
while lying about being innocent and confession to complicity in cheat= 
ing. Highs maintained longer eye contact while maintaining their in= 
nocence than did Lows. Highs also confessed less often than Lows, 
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overall. Ipdependent observers rated the subjects on an anxiety dimen= 
sion during baseline and interrogation periods. Highs appeared to be 
considerably less anxious than Lows in both periods. Geis and Christie 
(1970) have interpreted the data on duration of eye contact and emotion"" . 
·al appearance·to mean that Highs are more emotionally detached than 
Lows. 
This study provided mixed support for the prediction that Highs 
would resist implication more effectively than Lows. Highs and Lows 
acquiesced to the confederate's implication attempts to the same degree 
which fails to support the experimental prediction. This finding may 
be due to the limited options of resistance available to them. The 
confederate had located the·answers, written them down on a scrap paper 
and recited them out loud. Resistance to implication under these cir= 
cumstances would have required the subject to adopt· extreme behaviors 
such as physically restraining the confederate from cheating, reporting 
the cheating to the experimenter or asking to withdraw from the exper-
iment •. The· extremity of the· alternatives may explain why only 4 of 42 
subjects adopted them. Whatever the explanation for this high degree 
·of acquiescence in cheating, the behavior of the 38 subjects who went 
along with the actions of the confederate would seem to support Mach= 
iavelli's contention that men are dishonest. 
The paradigm also provided evidence which supports: the prediction 
that Highs would resist implication more effectively than Lows. Indep= 
endent observers found that Highs displayed greater initial resistance 
to the cOJnfe.derate's implication attempt than did Lows. Highs confes= 
sed less· often than Lows and maintained longer eye contact with the 
experimenter while claiming to be innocent. Taken as a whole 9 the pat= 
tern of results from this study provides a small measure of su.pport for 
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the thesis that Highs are more resistant to social influence than Lows. 
Bogart et aL. (1970) adapted the Exline et al. (1970) paradigm to 
examine the effects of Machiavellianism and dissonance variables on 
self-ratings of personal:"morality. A confederate was used to implicate 
the subject in cheating after the experimenter left the room to receive 
a long distance phone call as in the previous paradigm. In this study, 
implication was attempted by arranging to have the .confederate find the 
answer.sheet within the room and have him simply urge the subject to 
use the answers. Here, the subject had a less extreme option in resist= 
ing the implication attempt by the confederate. He could simply refuse 
to use the confederate's answers. 
Two dissonance conditions were presented in this paradigm. In the 
high dissonance condition, the·confederate's personality was unfavor= 
ably described by the experimenter prior to the task. The experiment-
ers presumed that this condition would arouse a high level of disson-
ance in subjects who complied with the confederate's urging to cheat 
because they would be complying with an unliked, low-prestige partner, 
and would thus, have little justification for cheating. In the low 
dissonance condition, the confederate's personality was described prior 
to the task in a manner that made him appear to be liked and high in 
prestige. The experimenters reasoned that this condition would arouse 
a low level of dissonance in complying subjects as they would have 
considerable justification for cheating. The Mach IV scale was readmin= 
istered to all subjects following completion of the task to assess 
changes in self~ratings on the morality dimension. The Mach IV scale 
was chosen to measure morality since it contains items relevant to con= 
ventional Judeo=Christian values. 
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The results of this investigation were also indecisive. Highs 
cheated no more frequently than did Lows, complying more often with 
the attractive partner (low-dissonance condition) than the unattract-
ive partner (high-dissonance condition). Lows complied equally in both 
treatment conditions. Highs and Lows differed in the shifts observed 
in their Mach IV scores. Highs who complied in the high and low dis-
sonance conditions did not significantly change their self-ratings 
afterwards. In sharp contrast, Lows who complied in the high~disson­
ance condition obtained higher Mach IV scores on the second testing, 
while those complying in the low-dissonance condition obtained lower 
Mach IV scores. 
The pattern of experimental results failed to support the predict= 
ion that Highs would resist implication more effectively than Lows. 
Highs and Lows demonstrated equivalent rates of compliance which is 
consistent with the results of the prior Exline et al. (1970) inves-
tigation •. It is important to note that the overall compliance rates for 
the two st1,1dies were strikingly different. Thrity-eight of 42 subj-
ects in the Exline et al. (1970) paradigm complied with the confederate 
as opposed to 29 of 61 subjects in the Bogart et al. (1970) study. 
The difference in compliance rates may have been due to the different 
options for resistance available to the subjects. In the Exline group 0 s 
situation, successful resistance to implication would have· required 
physical restraint of the confederate, reporting the·confederate's 
cheating to the experimenter or withdrawing from the experiment. These 
sould have been extreme behaviors for college undergraduates. In sharp 
contrast, the Bogart group's situation afforded subjects the less 
extreme option of simply refusing to use the stolenanswers. 
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The finding in the Bogart situ~tion that Highs complied more often 
in the low-dissonance condition than in the high-dissonance condition 
is difficult to explain. Bogart et al. (1970) argues that Highs had 
more justification to comply with the confederate when he was described 
as being attractive and possessing high-status (low=dissonance condit= 
ion), than when he was described in an unattractive fashion (high~ 
dissonance condition). This explanation is unsatisfactory because it 
begs the question of why partner attractiveness would serve as a just= 
ification for Highs' compliance. The role of perceptions of partner 
attractiveness in justifying compliance by Highs appears to be partic= 
ularly questionable in light of Highs' negative evaluation of others 
(Harris, Note 2) and emotional detachment in interpersonal situations 
(Geis & Christie, 19iO; Exline et a1., 1970). Lows exhibited identical 
compliance rates in both· high and low-dissonance conditions. The 
authors playsibly argue that this finding reflected Lows' greater em= 
otional involvement with their partners. 
Geis and Christie (1970) interpreted the before and after measures 
of Highs' and Lows' Mach IV scores as providing evidence of Highs' 
greater resistance to social influence. Methodological problems render 
this conclusion questionali>,le. The use of a before-after design to 
measure changes in self-ratings following compliance with a confederate 
makes interpretation of the data very difficult due to possible inter~ 
action between the pretest (the first administration of the Mach IV 
scale) and the experimental manipulation (the confederate's attempts to 
gain the subject 1 s compliance). Insko (1967) cautioned: 
A study is not necessarily invalid simply because it employs 
a before=after design. We really, however, need more infor= 
mation about the circumstances under which a pretest x 
persuasive manipulation interaction might or might not 
occur. Satisfactory and thorough evaluation of attitude 
change research based on before-after designs cannot be 
·achieved until such information is possessed (p~ 5). 
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The stability of pretest-posttest measures of Highs on the Mach IV 
scale need not reflect resistance to social influence. The stability 
in Mach IV scores may be due to indifference whether their actions·and 
beliefs· appear con~listent, tolerance of cognitive dissonance or concern 
that their self-ratings appear .consistent. Thus, the data admit several 
alternative· inte.rpretations. 
The interpretation of Lows; high Mach IV scores in the high=disson= 
· ance- condition and lower Mach IV s.cores in the low-dissonance· condition 
is also unclear due to the methodological problems inherent in before~ 
after designs and the availability' of alternative explanations. While 
Geis and Christie (1970) construed these findings to mean that Lows 
were more vulnerable to social influence than Highs, it seems equally 
plausible that the findings reflect Lows' greater concern about appear-
ing consistent in beleif and action or·lower tolerance of cognitive 
dissonance. 
The Mach IV scale seems to be an inappropriate· tool for the meas· .. 
·urement of morality. The scale contains items dealing with interper= 
· sonal tactics· and desc:ription of human nature in. addition to those 
dealing with abstract morality (Chris.tie, 1970c). The heterogeneous 
item content of the scale would seem to preclude the precise measure= 
ment of morality. 
The two resistance-to-implication studies provided weak support at 
best for the thesis that Highs resist social influence more effectively 
than Lows. In both studies, Highs and Lows acquiesced or complied with 
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the confederate's urging to cheat to an equivalent degree. The high 
overall rate of compliance found in both studies would seem to support 
Machiavelli's contention that men are dishonest. The Exline et al. 
(1970) paradigm provided data which supports the thesis. Highs exhib-
ited longer eye contace while maintaining their-innocence, confessed to 
cheating less often and appeared to be less anxious than Lows. The 
attitude·change data from the Bogart et al. (1970) situation cannot be 
definitively interpreted to either support or contradict the experiment-
al thesis due to problems of methodology, alternative explanations and 
the inappropriateness of using the Mach IV scale to measure morality. 
Harris (Note 2) and Durkin (1970) studies the influence of partners 
on task performance. Harris instructed Highs and Lows to read excerpts 
from Beckett's Waiting iQE. Godot and then individually rate the two 
main protagonists on 16 esoteric traits on a to-point scale. After the 
subject rated the first protagonist-alone, he was asked to rate the 
same character jointly with either a High or Low partner. The same 
procedure was followed for the rating of the second protagonist. Mach= 
iavellianism was counterbalanced so that if the partner for the rating 
of the first protagonist was a High, the partner for the evaluation of 
the second protagonist would be a Low. 
-Highs changed their judgments when rating the protagonists jointly 
with a partner to a considerably smaller degree than Lows across both 
High and Low partners. While this outcome appears to support the pre= 
diction that Highs would resist their partners 1 influence to a greater 
extent than Lows, the methodological difficulties inherent ina before= 
after design make a precise interpretation impossible. As Insko (1967) 
cautioned, the experimenter using a before=after design-in the study 
of attitude change runs the risk of an interaction between the pretest 
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and the manipulation. An alternative explanation for the Harris data 
is that Highs were more concerned with appearing consistent in their 
ratings ·of the protagonists than Lows. Taken together, the methodol-
ogical problems inherent in a before-after design and the availability 
of a plausible alternative explanation of the experimental results 
necessitate a cautious acceptance of the Harris findings. 
It the Harris (Note 2) findings are cautiously accepted, the par= 
adigm provides evidence of a difference between Highs and Lows in res= 
istance to social influence. The paradigm was not designed to provide 
the information required to determine whether the operative influence 
process· was conformity or compliance. The process of conformity in= 
volves the alteration of the subject's private perception of a stimulus 
for a prolonged period of time, while the compliance process produces 
a shift in only the subject's public behavior (Wrightsman, 1973). An 
operational distinction between these processes would involve private 
measurement of the subject's perceptions (ratings of the protagonists) 
at least several weeks after the post measure was completed. Since 
this procedure was not incorporated into the design of the Harris 
experiment, it remains unclear whether Highs were more resistant than 
Lows to a process of conformity or co~pliance. 
Durkin (1970) placed males and females into 23 two=boy, two-girl 
tetrads. The tetrads were given a cooperative task in which they had 
to roll a ball up a spiral ramp. Individual skill levels were compared 
with joint performance. 
Tetrads containing Highs performed in a manner that suggested to 
independent observers that each player 1 s individual skill accounted 
for the tetrad 1 s overall performance. Durkin (1970) inferred from this 
finding that Highs were uninfluenced by their partner. Tetrads containing 
Lows seemed to perform in a manner that suggested that an interaction 
between the members accounted for the overall performance. Lows' per-
formance did not seem to simply reflect a:.summation of skill levels. 
The author interpreted this finding to mean that Lows were more influ-
enced by their partners than Highs. 
The main problem in the interpretation of Durkin's (1970) findings 
is that the presence of interaction among the subjects does not in it-
self constitute satisfactory evidence of susceptibility to social 
influence. A second problem in interpreting the data is that merely 
noting that there was interaction among members of the tetrads does not 
reveal who influenced whom. These problems render the Durkin findings 
uninterpretable with respect to the support or contradiction of the 
experimental thesis. 
The partner influence on task performance studies of Harris (Note 
2) and Durkin (1970) provide evidence which is consistent with the 
thesis that Highs are more resistant to social influence than Lows, but 
which is open to alternative interpretations. While the Harris data 
appears to show that Highs shifted their protagonist ratings to a 
smaller degree than Lows when they interacted with their partners, the 
danger of an interaction between the pretest and the manipulation and 
the alternative possibility that Highs were concerned that their ratings 
appeared consistent rendered a precise interpretation impossible. Sim~ 
ilarly, while the Durkin evidence that Lows interacted more vigorously 
with their partners than Highs is consistent with the experimental 
thesis, it is too ambiguous to provide direct evidence that Highs dif= 
fered from Lows in their resistance to social influence. 
The attitude change studies may be divided into face-to=face inter= 
action paradigms (Geis et al., Note 3) and counter=attitudinal advocacy 
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paradigms (Epstein, 1969; Feiler, Note 4). The face-to-face interaction 
study will be examined first. Geis et al. (Note 3) arranged subjects 
in groups of either four or five. 1:ach group was composed so that one 
High and one Low agreed with the Mach IV item, "The best way to handle 
people is to tell them what they want to hear." Each group also con= 
tained one High and one Low who d~sagreed with this item. The groups 
were instructed to discuss a revised version of this Mach IV item for 
10 minutes. Half of the groups were to discuss the revised item, i!Tell 
them what they want to hear, rather than telling the truth 3 vi while the 
remaining half were to discuss, "Tell them the truth 3 rather than what 
they want to hear." The experimenter collected each subject's opinion 
on the discussion topic in private before the discussions began and 
then asked the groups to proceed with their discussions with the obj= 
ective of reaching a consensus. After the discussions were completed, 
each subject privately indicated his own position on the discussed 
item for a second time. Thus, this investigation of attitude change 
used a before-after design. 
The crucial datum concerned shifts from the first rating of opinion 
taken prior to the discussion to the second which came at the end of 
the discussion. Consistent with the experimental thesis, only Lows 
exhibited a shift in their opinion on the revised item. The main 
problems in interpreting this finding concern the·use·of a before= 
after design~ the availability of an alternative explanation and the 
inability of the experiment to discriminate between processes of con= 
formity and compliance. The use of a before=after design introduced 
the danger that the first rating of opinion interacted in an unknown 
fashion with the subsequent discussion. The risk of this kind of in= 
teraction requires that the finding be accepted with caution. The 
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finding that only Lows exhibited an attitudinal shift appears to be 
open to the aJ.J.ternative explanation that Highs were more concerned than 
Lows about appearing consistent.in their attitudes. Finally, since 
the second measure of opinion was taken only 10 minutes after the 
first, the data do not permit us to determine whether a conformity 
process or a compliance process was operating in this paradigm. These 
difficulties require that the Geis et al. (Note 3) data be treated 
cautiously. 
The counter=attitudinal advocacy studies were designed by Epstein 
(1969) and Feiler (Note 4). Epstein selected Highs and Lows who 
strongly advocated flouridation of water so that there would be no dif-
ference between Highs and Lows on this issue. Subjects were told that 
the experimenter was devising a tape-recorded "discussion series 0v con= 
cerning flouridation for college radio stations. Half the subjects 
read a booklet with a "positive sponsor" and the remaining half read 
a booklet with a ''negative sponsor" which contained the same arguments 
against flouridation. Half of the subjects were then asked to develop 
talks opposing flouridation for the college radio networks. Attitudes 
towards flouridation were sub~equently measured for both subjects who 
had only silently read the booklet and those who developed talks sup= 
porting the counter~attitudinal position (opposition to flouridation). 
Again, attitude change was studied .using·a beforemafter design. 
Lows shifted more toward antiflouridation attitudes following 
talks opposing flouridation than after the silent reading of the book= 
lets. Highs, in contrast, exhibited stronger opposition to flourid= 
ation after reading the factual arguments contained in the booklets 
than after delivering talks against flouridation. The crucial finding 
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in this study was that only Lows shifted their attitudes concerning 
flouridation following public advocacy of a counter-attitudin~l posit-
ion (opposition to flouridation). 
Geis and Christie (1970) interpreted this pattern of results to 
mean that Highs were more resistant to social influence than Lows. 
These findings were held to support the conclusion that the rational 
Highs could only be influenced by factual arguments, while Lows were 
more sensitive to what others would think of a discrepancy between 
public behavior and stated opinion. While the Epstein findings appear 
to be consistent with the e~perimental thesis, problems concerning the 
use of a before-after design, alternative explanation of these find= 
ings and the discrimination between the processes of conformity and 
compliance necessitate a conservative interpretation. The use of a 
before-after design introduced the risk that the first measurement of 
opinion might have interacted with the subsequent manipulations (read= 
ing booklets and delivering counter-attitudinal speeches). The unknown 
danger of such an interaction renders a precise interpretation of the 
data impossible. Geis and Christie (1970) made two large interpretive 
leaps in their discussion of the Epstein data. Their first leap in= 
valved concluding from the finding that only Lows shifted their attit= 
udes following public advocacy of a counter=attitudinal position that 
Lows were more concerned than Highs about appearing consistent in public 
behavior and private opinion. The second leap involved asserting that 
the first conclusion was proof that Lows are more·velnerable than Highs 
to social influence. While the Epstein data is consistent with both 
conclusions, it does not directly prove them. Finally~ sd.nce the second 
measurement of private opinion was taken within the· same day as the 
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first measurement, it is.· impossible to determine whether a . conformity 
ot a compliance process was operating in this paradigm. For these 
reasons the Epstein date must be interpreted with caution. 
The Feiler (Note 4) paradigm placed subjects in groups of four. 
Two subjects debated each other twice in alternate rounds and also 
judged the debates of the other two. In one debate, the subject def-
ended a counter-attitudinal position, while in his second debate he 
defended a position which he personally endorsed. Subject opinions 
were measured before and after the debates. 
Consistent with the prediction that Highs would be more resistant 
to social influence than Lows, only Lows shfited their attitudes fol-
lowing advocacy of a counter-attitudinal position. This shift was 
observed only when Lows believed that they had won the debates. Lows 
also endorsed their private opinion more strongly following debates in 
which they defended this opinion regardless of whether they believed 
that they had won or lost. Highs, in contrast, did not change their 
opinions across either condition regardless of whether they believed 
that they had won or lost. 
Interpretation of these findings is complicated by the problems 
inherent in a before=after design, ~he possibility of an alternative 
interpretation and the inability to discriminate between conformity and 
compliance processes. The choice·of a before=after design created the 
danger that the first measurement of the subjects' opinions might in= 
teract with the subsequent manipulation (the debates). Since the pre= 
sence of such an interaction is unknown, the findings require cautious 
interpretation. As in the previous studies, while tha data are consist= 
e.nt>:with the experimental thesis, the data do not provide direct proof 
of it. It is plausible to argue that the data only show that Lows are 
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more concerned than Highs about appearing discripant in public behavior 
and private opinion. Concern about appearing inconsistend does not 
empirically require that Lows also be more vulnerable to social influ-
ence attempts. Lastly, the short interval between the first and second 
measurements·of opinion made it impossible to determine whether proces-
ses involving conformity or compliance were present in the Feiler 
paradi~ •. These difficulties preclude precise interpretation of the 
data. 
The counter-attitudinal advocacy paradigms provide data which is 
consistent with the experimental thesis, but which cannot constitute 
firm proof of the thesis due to problems concerning methodology and 
availability of alternative explanations. The methodological problem 
shared by both the Epstein (1969) and Feiler (Note 4) studies was the 
choice of a before-after design. This design entails the serious 
danger of an interaction between the first measurement of attitude and 
the subsequent manipulation. The risk of such an interaction renders 
interpretation inexact and hazardous. 
Both paradigms were open to a plausible alternative explanation of 
their results. In both cases, it could be convincingly argued that the 
data only showed that Lows were more concerned than Highs about appear~ 
· ing consistent and that this concern could be empirically unrelated 
to VU.lnerability to the influence attempts of others. 
A final criticism of both studies was that they did not permit the 
determination of whether conformity or compliance processes were in 
operation. Without this information, it is impossible to ascertain to 
which influence processes the results apply. This constitutes a serious 
problem since it is possible that a subject who resists a compliance 
process might be vulnerable to ·a conformity process. Overall, the three 
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attitude change studies provide only ambiguous support for the exper-
imental thesis that Highs are more resistant to social influence than 
Lows. 
Finally, Jones et al. (1962) investigated the effects of negative 
feedback on self-description. Subjects were told that they would be 
given two personality interviews to provide information on interviewer~ 
interviewee impressions for a graduate personality course. Half of the 
subjects were asked to honestly portray themselves, while the other 
half was asked to con the interviewer into believeing that they were 
nicer than they were. Following the first interview, the interviewer 
left to prepare an evaluation while the subject wrote her impression 
of the interviewer. Subjects were then given negative or positive feed-
back concerning their personality by the interviewer after which they 
were asked to complete a second rating on him. All subjects were then 
interviewed by a different interviewer using the same procedure as 
before. 
The crucial datum in this experiment was the degree of change in 
the positiveness of self-description from the first interview to the 
second. Consistent with the thesis that Highs are more resistant to 
social influence than Lows, only Lows described themselves more posit= 
ively during the second interview following negative feedback from the 
first interviewer. Highs, in contrast to Lows, did not alter their 
self-descriptions following either positive or negative feedback. Two 
problems render interpretation of the data very difficult. First, the 
paradigm involved a before~after design so that there was opportunity 
for the first self-description to interact with the positive or negative 
feedback in an undisclosed fashion. The danger of such an interaction 
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requires that the data be interpreted conservatively. Second, while _:_ 
the findings are consistent with the experimental thesis, they may also 
be plausibly explained as the result of Highs' greater concern to be 
consistent in their self-descriptions. Therefore, while the findings 
from this study seem to be consistent with the experimental thesis, 
problems due to methodology and availability of an alternative explan-
ation render this study's implication for the experimental thesis 
uncertain. 
While the social manipulation studies were successful in support-
ing the first thesis that Highs are more effective manipulators than 
Lows, the resistance to social influence studies have failed to provide 
consistent and convincing evidence of the Machiavellianism scales' 
criterion validity with respect to resistance of others' manipulative 
attempts. Nei~her have these studies provided strong empirical support 
for the conceptualization of a Machiavellian personality characterized 
by resistance to social influence. Problems concerning the use of a 
before-after design and the existence.of plausible alternative explan-
ations of the data have rendered the meaning of the empirical findings 
ambiguous so that the second thesis stands neither supported nor con-
tradicted. 
The current impasse in evaluating the second thesis that Highs are 
more resistant to social influence than Lows is unfortunate because the 
question of vulnerability to social influence is both a reasonable and 
important one. This question is reasonable because there is empirical 
support to demonstrate that Highs are more·emotionally detached (Exline 
et al., 1970) and suspicious of others (Christie et al., 1970) than 
lows. These characteristics would seem to render Highs more resistant 
to social influence as Highs would be insensitive to what others felt 
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about their actions. Suspiciousness of others would protect Highs from 
the manipulative attempts of others as Highs would be vigilant against 
attempts to deceive them. Based on these characteristics, the predict-
ion that Highs would be more resistant to social influence than Lows 
seems completely warranted. 
The question of whether Highs are more resistant to social influ= 
ence than Lows possesses considerable importance for both personality 
theory and social psychology. The Machiavellian concept has played an 
important role in the speculations of Freud, Adler and Fromm. The in-
corporation of Machiavellian attitudes and behaviors can be seen in 
Freud's oral personality, Adler's "will to power" and Fromm's exploit-
ative orientation. But while these theorists incorporated aspects of 
a Machiavellian personality into their models of personality on a 
piecemeal basis, a completely Machiavellian personality typology had to 
await the contribution of Agger, Christie and Pinner. Their proposal 
of a Machiavellian personality provided personality theory with a new 
conceptual scheme for the description and explanation of human personal= 
ity. The usefulness of this typology has already been demonstrated for 
the prediction of the manipulative behavior. What remains is to <let= 
ermine whether this typology is useful in predicting resistance to 
social influence as well. 
The question of Highs' resistance to social influence also posses-
ses important implications for social psychology. This question should 
interest social psychologists because it deals with the ·exercise of 
interpersonal influence which is a crucial problem for the discipline. 
Examination of the Machiavellian as a target of influence promises to 
extend the social psychologist's understanding of the mechan~cs of in= 
terpersonal influence, particularly the conditions under which individ= 
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uals resist or comply with the influence attempts of others. Thus, 
the question of Highs' vulnerability to social influence promises to be 
informative to both personality and social psychology. 
Given that the question of whether Highs are more resistant to 
social influence than Lows is both reasonable and important, the 'next 
task is to decide which social influence process - compliance or con-
formity - whould be studied. In order to make that decision, these 
two processes and paradigms which illustrate their operation will be 
examined within the context of social norm formation. When both pro-
cesses and their respective paradigms have been reviewed, a rationale 
for selecting one of these processes in favor of the other will be 
presented. 
Social Norm Formation 
Norms formed in judgment situations are characterized by a range 
of estimates and a modal point located within that range. Norms con-
stitute expectations or ·models of the environment formed from personal 
experience and social communication. These models summarize and eval-
uate in terms of acceptability the phenomena - persons, behavior, events 
and objects which they represent. A social norm is a range of judg-
ments and a corresponding modal point located within that range which 
emerge from the interaction of two or more individuals and which is 
shared by the members of this social unit to varying degrees. Sherif 
and Sherif (1969) emphasized the evaluative function of social norms 
by likening them to a yardstick: 
A social norm is an evaluative scale (e.g., yardstick) 
designating an acceptable lattitude and an objectionable 
lattitude for behavior, activity, events, beliefs or any 
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other subject of concern to members of a social unit 
(p. 141). 
Social norms may be described in terms of their arbitrariness. 
Pace and MacNeil (1974) explained: 
The degree of arbitrariness of a given norm may be 
placed on a theoretical continuum from least to most 
arbitrary. The least arbitrary norm is called the . 
natural nrom. The natural norm is that norm (defined 
by range and focus) which, under the conditions, will 
develop in the absence of external (experimental) in-
fluence. 
The more unrealistic (unnatural) the norm that 
develops, the more arbitrary it is (p. 576). 
The formation of social norms in social judgment situations (such 
as the autokinetic situation) results from a convergence of the norms 
(judgment ranges and their modal points) possessed by the members of a 
social unit. This convergence depends upon the properties of the 
stimulus situation, the unique characteristics of the judging individ-
uals and the emergent properties of the interact ion between the ind iv= 
iduals and the situation (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). The most important 
properties of the stimulus situation are the degree of stimulus struct= 
ure and the experimenter's communications. Stimulus structure is 
defined by the number of alternative ways that the stimulus situation 
may be patterned. The less structure the stimulus situation contains~ 
the more influential will be social communications which provide alter-
native means of patterning the situation (Pace & MacNeil, 1974). 
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) termed this proved informational influenee. 
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The experimenter's communications can influence both a subject's 
self·attirbutions and the attributions his interaction partners apply 
to him with the effect of facilitating or inhibiting the convergence 
of individual norms. Individuals who are told that their judgments 
are accurate tend to attribute greater expertise to themselves and show 
less convergence with their interaction partners' norms than those who 
are told that their judgments are inaccurate (Kelman, 1950; Mausner, 
1954; Harvey & Rutherford, 1958; Luchins & Luchins, 1961; Stone, 1967). 
Moreover, the experimenter's attributions of credibility, prestige, 
status and task competence to a subject tend to be adopted by his in-
teraction partners with the effect of increasing the convergence of 
their norms with his private norm (Mausner, 1953; Kidd & Campbell, 
1955; Croner & Willis, 1961; Graham, 1962). 
A crucial characteristic of the judging individual is his confid-
ence in the accuracy of his estimates. Subjects who lack confidence 
tend to converge with the norms of their interaction partners (Sherif 
& Sherif, 1969) and task instructions which heighten his performance 
anxiety tend to increase the degree to which he converges with the 
norms of others (Walters, Marshall & Shooter, 1960). Conversely, as 
stated earlier, subjects who are told that their judgments are accurate 
tend to be confident in their judgments and are resistant to the norms 
of others (Kelman, 1950, Mausner, 1954; Harvey & Rutherford, 1958; 
Luchins & Luchins, 1961; Stone, 1967). 
Two important emergent properties of the interaction between 
subjects and the stimulus situation are the arbitrariness of an indiv-
idual norm and the demand characteristics of the experiment. The 
arbitrariness of a norm is defined by its discrepancy from the natural 
norm (the range and modal point located within that range which would 
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be formed in the absence of experimental manipulation). The more arb~ 
itrary an individual's norm is perceived to be by the other interact~ 
ion partners, the lower their tendency to converge with it (Campbell, 
1961; MacNeil, Note 7). The demand characteristics of an experiment 
represent a second emergent property of the interaction between subjects 
and the stimulus situation. Orne (1969) postulated that subjects 
search the experimental situation for cues regarding the nature of the 
experimental hypothesis so that they can perform in a confirmatory 
fashion. Presumably, convergence observed in judgment situations may 
reflect a subject's attempt to help the experimenter prove what is 
believed to be the experimental hypothesis. Schulman (1967) termed 
this process normative influence. 
The Compliance Process 
Compliance and conformity may be conceptualized as two separate 
processes capable of producing the convergence of estimates found in 
social judgment situations. The convergence of judgments created by 
the compliance process appears to be a temporary phenomenon lasting 
only as long as social pressure is present in the ryudgment situation 
(Follis & Montgomery, 1966). The convergence of estimates seems to 
represent public behavior unrelated to private perceptions. In com-
pliance, private perceptions appear to remain uaaltered (Wrightsman, 
1973). The adoption of public behavior may serve a broad range of 
pruposes. Compliance behavior may function to avoid real or imagined 
threats of reprisal (Schulman, 1967). Social exchange theory (Gould-
ner, 1960; Adams, 1965) suggests that a complying response may be re-
warding to some individuals, while it may serve as a down payment on 
anticipated rewards for others (Hollander & Willis, 1967). Finally, 
compliance may enable a low-status individual to ingratiate himself · 
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with the group leader (Jones, 1965) or a leaqer to increase his "idio-
syncrasy credit" with;i.n the group (Hollander, 1958, 1964). 
Paradigms most likely to produce compliance behavior are charact-
erized by a high degree of stimulus structure (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). 
Two studies representative of the compliance process were by Asch 
(1951) and Crutchfield (1955). 'l'llese studies will be described and 
their major findings considered. Asch arranged for six confederates 
to give false public judgments on 12 critical trials in the presence of 
a naive subject in an 18-trial line comparison task. The lengths to 
be compared were objectively different so that few subjects erred when 
making line comparisons alone (Asch, 1956). While 32 per cent of all 
subjects responses on the critical trials were in the direction of the 
majority, there was considerablev~riation due to individual differences 
(Asch, 1956, 1958). A subsequent test of the subjects' line comparisons 
when alone and removed from social pressure was not conducted. This 
procedure wouldhave provided valuable evidence concerning whether com-
pliance or conformity processes were.operating in this paradigm. 
The Asch paradigm contained a high degree of stimulus structure as 
the differences in lenght among the lines to be matched were apparent 
to most subjects. The curation of interaction was limited to the trials 
presented in a single experimental session. A situation characterized 
by a considerable degree of ·stimulus structure would be expected to 
produce a change in public behavior (verbal line comparisons) without 
an accompanying change in the subjects' private perceptions of the 
stimuli. This analysis was supported by the results of post-experiment-
al questioning of subjects who had agreed with the majority on critical 
trials. Few of these subjects reported having perceived the majority's 
answers as being correct which would have been indicative of conformity. 
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The bulk of subjects who had: publicly agreed with the majority explained 
that they had either agreed while privately believing that the majority 
was incorrect or had agreed be~ause the majority reduced their confid-
ence in the answer theystill believed to be correct (Asch, 1951, 1956). 
The persistence of the convergent judgments obtained in this paradigm 
when the subj.ect was removed from social pressure could not be deter-
mined as a sub¢equent test of line comparisons under this condition 
was not conducted. Therefore, valuable evidence concerning whether the 
convergence of judgments represented compliance or conformity was not 
acquired. 
Two variations in the Asch paradigm were of particular interest. 
In the first variation, Asch reduced the discrepancy among the lengths 
of the lines to be compared and obtained a higher rate of agreement 
with the majority on critical trials (Asch, 1951). This variation 
served to reduce the amoun~ of stimulus structure present in the sit-
uation and consequently the arbitrariness of the confederates' norm. 
The results were consistent with the proposition that reduction of 
stimulus structure and norm arbitrariness increases the importance of 
social influences whicp provide alternative ways to pattern the exper-
ience (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). Presumably, the increased rate of agre-
ement on critical trials was due to a conformity process in addition 
to the compliance produced by the presence of a unanimous majority. 
In the second variation, the number of con•federa:t;es was altered 
(Asch, 1956; 1958; Rosenberg , 1961). These studies revealed that the 
highest rate of agreement was obtained using three confederates. The 
introduction of additional confederates did not appreciably improve the 
rate of agreement. Variation in the number of confederates may be con-
ceptualized as manipulating the degree of external pressure on the 
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subject to publicly report line comparisons in a manner that is con-
sistent with the judgments of the majority. This manipulation of ex-
ternal social pressure would seem to alter the effectiveness of the 
compliance process in altering public behavior (but not private per-
ceptions). 
Crutchfield (1955) placed five subjects in adjeeent. cubicles with 
instructions to answer multiple-ch©ice questions in varying order by 
activating the ~ppropriate switch on their individual panels. The 
questions ranged from line comparison to opinions and attitudes. Since 
each person's view, of the other ~ubjects was obstructed, feedback was 
supposedly provided about how preceeding subjects answered the questions 
by a set of panel lights. In rea~ity., the experimenter provided all 
five subjects with,the same information and had them respond at the 
same time. The critical datum was the individual's agreement on 21 
critical trials. Thirty-eight percent of all subjects responses on 
critical trials agreed with the fictitious majority, although in thi~ 
case, too, the finding must be qualified by the wide range of indiv-
idual differences in judgments'. A later testing of the subjects in 
which they answered the multiple-choice questions alone and isolated 
from social pressure was not conducted. Again, no evidence is available 
concerning the persistence of social norms in the absence of social 
pressure. This denies the reader information crucial to the discrim-
ination between compliance a~d conformity effects. 
The judgment tasks in the Crutchfield situation contained a high 
degree of stimulus structure equivalent to that present in the Asch 
situation. There was no face.-to-face interaction among the five 
subjects and the indirect interaction through the medium of console 
lights was limited to the single experimental session. These character-
54 
istics of the Crutchfield paradigm render it likely that a compliance 
process was responsible for most of the agEeement observed with the 
fictitious majority. 
The process of compliance has been described as one which produces 
a temporary convergence of estimates persisting only as long as social 
pressure is present. Compliance appears to serve a wide range of pur-
poses including avoidance of reprisals, acquisition of rewards, ingrat-
iation with group leaders and accumulation of "idiosyncrasy credit" 
within groups. Paradigms which generate compliance are characterized 
by a considerable degree of structure within the stimulus situation. 
Studies by Asch (1951) and Crutchfield (1955) were reviewed and this 
characteristic was found to be present in each paradigm. Since subjects 
were not subsequently observed alone and isolated from social pressure 
in either situation, the persistence of social norms in the absence of 
social pressure could not be determined. This information would have 
proved useful in determining whether the convergence of judgments ob-
tained in these two paradigms was due to compliance or conformity. 
The Conformity Process 
The process of conformity is distinct from that of compliance. 
The convergence of estimates observed in conformity appears to be a 
more permanent phenomenon than that found in compliance. In conformity, 
the convergence of judgments persists in the absence of social pres-
sure (Pollis & Montgomery, 1966). This convergence seems to represent 
a shift in private perception rather than the simple adoption of public 
behavior (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Wrightsman, 1973). The conformity 
process appears to be due to the operation of social influences in the 
patterning of experience when the external stimulus situation is un-
structured (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). The patterning process is postulated 
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to involve central nervous system processes in addition to peripheral 
receptor mechanisms (Luchins & Luchins, 1963). 
Paradigms possessing the greatest likelihood of producing confor-
mity contain a low degree of stimulus structure (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). 
Conformity situations by Sherif (1935) and MacNeil (MacNeil & Gregory, 
1969) will be described and their main findings reviewed. Sherif 
(1935) employed the autokinetic effect - the illusion that a stationary 
point of light in a completely darkened room possesses movement - in 
his important investigation of social norm formation. Sherif recorded 
estimates of movement from subjects making judgments alone, subjects 
who had previously made judgments alone but were subsequently placed 
together, subjects facing the atuokinetic situation together for the 
first time and subjects making judgments alone after making judgments 
together. Several important findings emerged from these manipulations: 
(1) There were marked individual differences in subjects' estim-
ates of movement. 
(2) Subjects making their judgments alone established a range and 
mode located within that range (an individual norm). 
(3) When subjects who had previously made their judgments alone 
were brought together, their individual norms tended to converge. The 
convergence was greater for subjects who had no previous opportunity to 
establish personal norms while alone. 
(4) Subjects who faced the autokinetic situation together for the 
first time formed a range and mode within that range (a social norm) 
characteristic of that social unit and fluctuation of the norm over 
trials was a social unit effect. 
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(5) Group members who faced the autokinetic situation alone after 
the development of a group norm adhered to that social norm in their 
judgments. 
The autokinetic situation used by Sherif (1935) contained a low 
degree of stimulus structure. A situation possessing this property 
would be expected to produce a shift in subjects' judgments which wou·ld 
persist a;fiter the subject-was isolated from social pressure. Several 
researchers in addition to Sherif have demonstrated the persistence of 
social norms formed within the autokinetic situation for periods of 
time of up to one year (Bovard, 1951; Roh-=e.r, Barron, Hoffman & Swander, 
1954; Walter, 1955; NacNeil, Note 8). The low degree of stimulus struct-
ure characteristic of the-autokinetic situation and the demonstrated 
persistence of soc_ial norms after subjects have been isolated from c..c-:: _. 
social pressure make it mos~ likely that the observed convergence of 
judgments constitutes conformity. 
The Hex situation was developed by MacNeil (MacNeil & Gregory, 
1969) to provide a social norm formation situation equivalent to the 
autokinetic paradigm. The Hex situation requires the subject to estim-
ate the distance between two points of light in a completely darkened 
room. Although the light pai:rs are objeftively equidistant, the axes 
between the lights are at different angles so that the subject per-
ceives the pairs of light as being at varying distances apart. Pace 
and MacNeil (1974) observed: 
The Hex utilizes, in part, the horizontal~vertical ill-
usion to create perceptual differences in the apparent 
distance between the points of light (Kannapas, 1959). 
The stimulus apparatus consists of 13 lights positioned 
on a vertical board in two overlapping hexagonal patterns 
·around a center light. Each randomly ordered present-
ation of the pairs of stimulus lights consists of two 
lights objectively equidistant (15 in.) from trial to 
trial but with the axes between the lights being at a 
different angle for each contingent presentation, 
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thus increasing the differences in Ss 1 perception (p. 577). 
Gregory (Note 5) recorded estimates of distances from subjects 
making judgments alon.e, subjects who faced the He& situation together, 
subjects who made estimates alone and later together, and subjects who 
made estimates together and later alone. Hd:s ·.investigation revealed 
that: 
(1) Subjects who faced the Hex situation alone formed and retained 
a personal norm in later sessions in which they were also alone. 
(2) Subjects who faced the Hex situation alone and then together 
converged toward a shared social norm. 
(3) Subjects who faced the Hex situation together for the first 
time maintained the social norm developed in that condition when they 
later faced the situation alone. 
The Hex situation developed by MacNeil (MacNeil & Gregory, 1969) 
possessed a low degree of stimulus structure which was slightly great= 
er than that of the autokinetic situation (Pace & MacNeils 1974). A 
situation characterized by this property would be expected to result in 
judgmer>.ts which would persist in the absence of social press·ure. The 
findings by Gregory (Note 5) demonstrated the persistence of social 
norms when the subjects were retested alone and removed from social 
pressure. Again~ the low degree of stimulus structure present in the 
Hes situation coupled with the finding of the persistent of emergent 
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social norms indicate that the observed convergence of judgments rep-
resents conformity. 
The process of conformity has been described as one which results 
in an enduring social norm which persists after social pressure is 
removed. Conformity has been explained as a prod~ct of central nervous 
system processes and peripheral receptor mechanisms which produce an 
enduring patterning of experience. Paradigms which generate conformity 
behavior are characterized by a low degree of stimulus structure. Social 
norm formation situations developed by Sherif (1935) and MacNeil (Mac-
Neil & Gregory, 1969) were examined and this property was found to be 
present in both. The observation of subjects alone and isolated from 
social pressure following the development of a social norm provided 
data concerning the persistence of these norm. This evidence indic-
ate that the convergence of judgments obtained in these paradigms rep-
resented conformity. 
The Selection of a Social Influence Process 
The processes of compliance and conformity have been examined and 
representative paradigms reviewed. The process of compliance was 
defined by an impermanence of social norms formed within a judgment 
situation. Social norms produced by the compliance process were found 
to persist only as long as social pressure was present. It was post-
ulated that this impermanence is due to the possibility that only pub-
lic behavior has been altered while private perceptions remain unaffect-
ed. In contrast, the process of conformity was characterized by a 
persistence of the emergent social norm in the absence of social pre-
ssure. The greater permanence of social norms produced by conformity 
was held to be due to the patterning of unstructured stimulus situations 
by central nervous system processes and peripheral receptor mechanisms. 
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A choice between the processes of compliance and conformity is 
necessary in order to frame a meaningful question concerning Highs' and 
Lows' resistance to social influence. To simply ask whether Highs 
resisted social influence more effectively than Lows leaves it uncertain 
which influence process the subjects are resisting. A finding about 
resistance to social influence based on a compliance paradigm may not 
be generalizable to resistance within a conformity paradigm. Therefore, 
the question concerning Highs' and Lows' resistance to social influence 
must be narrowed down to either compliance or conformity so that it will 
be clear to which process the experimental findings apply. 
The importance of an influence process for social psychology appears 
to be a reasonable criterion for the selection of one process in favor 
of another. While compliance and conformity are both ubiquitous to 
social behavior, conformity alone is theorized to serve as the basis 
for relatively enduring social norms such as values and stereotypes 
which are of considerable interest to social psychology. Sherif and 
Sherif (1969) observed: 
The psychological basis of established social norms - such as 
stereotypes, fashions, conventions, customs and values - is 
the formation of common reference: points or·anchorages as a r . 
product of interaction among individuals. Once such anchor-
ages are established and internalized by the individual, 
they become important factors in determining or modifying 
his reactions to the situations that he will face later 
alone = social and even nonsocial, especially if the 
stimulus field is not well structured (p. 207). 
Thus the process of conformity is selected because it alone is believed 
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to generate the enduring social nonns which are of particular interest 
to the discipline of social psychology. 
Framing an Experimental Hypothesis 
Now that 'conformity has been selected as the social influence 
process to be investigated, a specific experimental hypothesis may be 
proposed. Based on empirical evidence that Highs are more emotionally 
detached and consequently more ins.ensitive than Lows to others' ex-
pectations (Exline et::al., 1970) and that Highs are more suspicious of 
others than Lows (Christie et al., 1970), it is hypothesized that Highs 
will conform to a lesser degree than Lows within a social judgment 
situation. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the select-
ion of an appropriate methodology with which to test this hypothesis. 
Methodological Considerations 
The critical considerations in the development of a methodology 
with which to test the hypothesis - Highs will conform to a lesser 
degree than Lows within a social judgment situation - are the selection 
of an appropriate paradigm, experimental procedure, operational definit~ 
ion of the dependent variable (conformity) and subjects. In what 
follows, each of these considerations will be addressed separately. 
Selection of a P!radigm 
The paradigm chosen to test the experimental hypothesis should 
meet three main criteria: 
(1) The paradigm should posses the ability to produce conformity 
behavior. 
(2) The paradigm should allow differences in the degree to which 
individuals conform. 
(3) The paradigm should be robust. 
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The importance of these criteria and the differences among the 12 pre-
viously reviewed paradigms with respect to these considerations will be 
examined in the discussion that follows. 
There should be empirical evidence that the selected paradigm is 
able to produce comformity behavior so that there may be confidence that 
Highs' and Lows' resistance to the process of conformity--and not com-
pliance--will be tested. A standard for differentiating between these 
two social influence processes, advanced during the previous review of 
the resistance to social influence studies, was the persistence of the 
social norm in the absence of social pressure (Pollis & Montgomery, 1966; 
MacNeil, Note 6). In operational language, conformity is de~onstrated 
when the social norm (range and modal point ~ocated within that range) 
obtained when subjects make their judgments in each other's presence is 
subsequently obtained when the subjects are retested alone in the same 
judgment situation. 
A review of the 12 social influence paradigms considered earlier in 
the chapter reveals that conformity--persistence of a social norm in the 
absence of social pressure--has only been demonstrated in two situations: 
the autokinetic situation (Bovard, 1951; Rohrer et .al., 1954; Walter, 
1955; MacNeil, Note 8) and the Hex situation (Gregory, Note 5). Further, 
the Asch (1951) and Crutchfield (1955) paradigms are the only situations 
among the remaining 10 which involve the series of judgments required 
for the study of the formation of experimental social norms. These two 
situations were judged to produce compliance rather than conformity due 
to their high degree of stimulus structure (Asch, 1951, 1956; Crutch-
field, 1955; Graham, 1962). 
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Individual differences with respect to the degree of obtained 
conformity must be allowed by the paradigm or else differentiation 
between Highs and Lows on the basis of this variable will not be pos-
sible. If the paradigm produced a degree of conformity so strong that 
nearly all subjects (regardless of their Machiavellianism scores) 
produced identical judgments, it would be insensitive to possible 
differences in judgments due to a Machiavellianism variable. Pace and 
MacNeil (1974) demonstrated that both the autokinetic and Hex situations 
allowed for individual differences in the extent of conformity. Marked 
individual differences were observed in the subjects' estimates in 
both situations when a ratio of one confederate to three naive subjects 
was used. The experimenter attributed expertise to the confederate to 
strengthen the influence of his judgments which were located within an 
arbitrary range of values (discrepant from what an individual would 
perceive when facing the situations alone). 
The final criterion was that the paradigm be robust. Since the 
experimenter would be limited to one month's experience with the para-
digm, it should be relatively insensitive to the minor changes in 
emphasis, inflection and intonation which could be expected when exper-
ience in administering a situation is limited. The sensitivity of a 
social judgment situation to these factors is believed to be a function 
of the degree of stimulus structure present (MacNeil, Note 6). Since 
Pace and MacNeil (1974) concluded that the Hex situation possesses 
slightly greater stimulus structure than the autokinetic paradigm, the 
Hex situation would appear to be the more robust situation of the two. 
An alternative means of satisfying the third criterion would be to 
tape the rationale and instructions. This procedure would insure that 
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the presentation of this information would be identical for each sub-
ject. MacNeil (Note 6) argued convincingly against this approach 
because it would markedly reduce the amount of stimulus structure pre-
sent in an already relatively unstructured situation. The postulated 
effect of reduiced stimulus structure would be to render the subjects 
uncomfortable and increase the randomness of their estimates. These 
outcomes would seem likely to contaminate the experimental findings in 
the form of increased error variance and preclude a powerful test of the 
experimental hypothesis. 
Three main criteria have been used to evaluate 12 social influence 
situations with respect to their appropriateness in testing the experi-
mental hypothesis. The autokinetic and Hex situations were the only 
paradigms which both were able to produce conformity behavior and to 
allow individual differences in the degree of conformity obtained. The 
Hex situation was found to fulfill the final criterion of robustness 
more satisfactorily than the autokinetic paradigm due to its greater 
degree of stimulus structure. Thus, the Hex situation appears to be the 
most appropriate paradigm with which to test the experimental hypothesis. 
Experimental Procedure 
Now that the Hex situation has been chosen, it is necessary to 
select a specific procedure for its administration. Studies by Gregory 
(Note 5) and Pace and MacNeil (1974) involved two alternative procedures 
which may be evaluated for their appropriateness with respect to testing 
the experimental hypothesis. Gregory's (Note 5) procedure contained a 
social norm formation condition in which groups of two or three subjects 
made distance estimates (in the Hex situation) in each other 1s presence. 
This procedure provided quantified judgment data which permitted the 
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calculation of a range and modal point located within that range (a 
social norm) and the measurement of the degree of convergence among the 
subjects' judgments. While this procedure allowed the development and 
measurement of experimental social norms, the social situation=- as 
defined by the unique characteristics of each subject, the verbal inter= 
action among the participants and the particular pattern of estimates 
made by the subjects--was not held constant for each subject. Since an 
appropriate test of the experimental hypothesis requires that the only 
differences among subjects be their standing on the two Machiavellianism 
scales, the Gregory procedure which permits major variation in the 
social situation each subject faces must be judged to be inappropriate. 
Pace and MacNeil (1974) composed their experimental groups of one 
confederate and three p.aive subjects. The confederate was instructed to 
present judgments which were considerably discrepant from what a subject 
facing the situation alone would estimate. The range of these estimates 
(28 to 40 in.) was termed the arbitrary range. Although different con= 
federates were used with each experimental group, each confederate 
presented an identical range of judgments. As in the Gregory (Note 5) 
procedure, the social situation which each subject faced was not iden~ 
tical. Despite the fact that the confederates' judgments were identical 
with respect to their range, the precise pattern of judgments differed 
with ei,ach confederate •. Moreover, the confederates' unique personal 
characteristics==physical appearance and speech=-were allowed to vary. 
Finally, the individual characteristics of the three naive subjects were 
inconsistent across groups. These sources of variation·rendered the 
social situation unequivalent for each group of subjects. Thus, the 
procedure used by Pace and MacNeil (1974) is also inappropriate for a 
test of the experimental hypothesis. 
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The use ef confederates in the Pace and MacNeil (1974) investiga~ 
tion provided a clue as to how a comparable social situation may be 
constructed fer each subject. Experimental groups composed of a given 
number of confederates and one naive subject could be formed. The same 
confederates could be used in each group and these collaborators could 
present learned sequences of judgments located within the arbitrary 
range defined earlier. Further, the confederates could be instructed 
to dress in the same manner~· for each session and practice presentation 
of their estimates in a consistent manner. These precautions would 
seem to produce a nearly identical social situation for each subject. 
Two procedural questions concerning the number of confederates 
and judgment trials remain. The number of confederates used to produce 
social pressure should be sufficient to draw subjects' estimates into 
the arbitrary range, yet not so great that there would be no individual 
differences in the number of judgments which fall within this range. 
MacNeil (Note 8) obtained a very high. degree of conformity=~ranging 
from 77 to 100 per cent-- using a ratio. of four confederates to one 
naive subject. In this case, the confederates were not described to 
the subject as possessing expertise. MacNeil's finding suggests that a 
more moderate degree of conformity might be obtained by using a ratio 
of two confederates to one )l).aive subject" again~ without the attribu~ 
tion of expertise. 
The final procedural question concerns the number of judgment 
trials required to demonstrate the presence or absense of conformity. 
MacNeil (Note 6) contended that 30 trials (six blocks of five trials 
each) should be sufficient to establish the presence of conformity. 
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Operati6t):al Definition of Conformity 
The Pace and MacNeil (1974) investigation operationally defined 
conformity as the number of judgment medians located within the arbi~ 
trary range. This definition seems to be particularly appropriate to 
the procedure proposed in the last section since the naive subject, 
presumably, would be responding to the arbitrary judgments of the two 
confederates. The choice of judgment medians calculated from blocks of 
five trials each was suggested by MacNeil (Note 6). He argued that 
judgment medians provide a more representative measure of central ten~ 
dency than do means •. This position was supported by Hays (1963) who 
observed that medians are less sensitive to extreme scores than means. 
The earlier dsicussion concerning the differentiation of compliance 
from conformity provided an alternative operational definition of con-
formity--the persistenc~ of the range and modal point located within 
that range of the subject:' s judgments when he is moved from a together-
ness situation to one in which he is retested alone. Highs and Lows 
could be compared with respect to the degree to which their social norms 
persisted in the retesting period. Thi.s definition appears to be an 
acceptable alternative to that which was used in the Pace and MacNeil 
(1974) investigation and would seem to possess the additional advantage 
of providing a check as to whether the convergence of judgments obtained 
in the paradigm represented compliance or conformity. A comparison 
between the two definitions appears to be in order. 
The first definition (Pace & MacNeil) would appear to be more 
economical in terms of time invested in testing subjects. The retesting 
of subjects required by the second definition would double the testing 
time. The crucial question to be answered is whether this check on 
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conformity is worth the increased "investment of time. It may be 
plausibly argued that a check on conformity is unnecessary in the Hex 
situation. Sherif and lherif (1969) observed that conformity~-as 
opposed to compliance--may be expected from paradigms which possess 
a low degree of stimulus structure. The production of conformity 
behavior appears to be an inherent property of situations distinguished 
by a low order of stimulus structure due to the combined operation of 
central nervous system processes and peripheral receptor mechanisms 
which function to pattern the experience (Luchins & Luchins$ 1963). 
Both the Hex and autokinetic situations have been found to possess a 
low degree of stimulus structure (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Wrightsman~ 
1973; Pace & MacNeil, 1974) and as predicted both situations have 
demonstrated a persistence of the emergent social norm when subjects 
were retested alone (Boval;'d, 1951; Rohrer.et aL, 1954; Walter, 1955; 
MacNeil, Note 8; Gregory, Note 5). Consequently, it may be·concluded 
that the Hex situation inherently produces conformity behavior due to 
its low order of stimulus s~ructure and that this renders a check on 
confonnity unnecessary. Thus, since the second definition would be 
less economical while not producing a compensatory advantage over the 
qrst definition 9 MacNeil and Pace's (1974) operational definition is 
favored. 
The final methodological problem concerns the selection of sub~ 
jects. The main issues are the useof subjects of one or both sex 
and the seJ.ection of criterion scores withwhich to define Highs and 
Lows. There appears to be sex-related differences with respect to self~ 
ratings of the Mach IV and Mach V scales and manipulative behavior. 
Bndner (1962) found that females tended to score lower on the two 
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Machiavellian scales than did males. Singer (1964) discovered that 
females also differed from males in their choice of manipulative 
strategies. These findings er:ase the possibility that males and females 
might also differ in their response to the conformity process. To 
prevent sex-related differences from contributing to experimental error, 
the sex variable may be controlled by using either males or females in _ 
the experiment. Since the Budner (1962) and Singer (1964) studies do 
not provide sufficient evidence to support speculationas to whether 
males or·females would provide a better test of the experimental hypo= 
thesis, selection of one sex on the basis of a coin toss wo~lld seem to 
be in order. The result of that procedure favored males. 
The selection of criterion scores with which to define Highs and 
Lows presents a difficult problem s'ince the eight resistance to social 
influence studies reviewed earlier in the chapter used considerably 
different criteria. The main objective in selecting criterion scores 
is to use scores which will define Highs and Lows to the exclusion of 
Mids as Christie and Geis (1970a) suggested that Mids might represent a 
third Machiavellian typology whose inclusion might confound the 
experimental data. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to adopt 
Christie and Geis' (1970a) convention of defining Highs and Lows on the 
basis· of Mach IV and Mach V scores located in the upper third and lower 
third of the obtained score distribution, respecti~ely. 
The methodological issues involved in the selection of an appro= 
priate paradigm, experimental procedure, operational definition of con~ 
formity and subjects have been considered and a metho<lplogy adopted. 
In the next chapter, the specific~ details of this methodology will be 
examined. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Investigation of the hypothesis--Highs will conform to a lesser 
degree than Lows within a social judgment situation--required identi-
fication of Highs and Lows and their assignment to the Hex situation. 
This chapter reviews the subjects, materials and procedures used to test 
the experimental hypothesis. 
Subjects 
Eighteen undergraduate males (9 Highs and 9 Lows) drawn from 
Introductory and Social Psychology courses and obtaining Mach IV scores 
approximately one-third of one standard deviation (6.6) above or below 
the sample median (86) were assigned to the Hex situation. Highs 
obtained a mean of 102.4 on the Mach IV scale with a range of 42 (133-
92). Lows obtained a mean of 68.3 with a range of 13 (76-64). The 18 
males were selected from an initial pool of 150 male and 150 female 
undergraduates. 
Materials 
This investigation utilized a Wollensack casette tape recorder, 
Mach IV scale, a debriefing questionnaire which included Byrne's (1971) 
Interpersonal Judgment Scale and the Mach V scale, the Hex laboratory 
and adjacent briefing room, the two male confederates, schedules of 
estimates for each confederate, and the rationale and task instructions 
for the Hex situation (discussed in Procedure). 
69 
70 
The Wollensack tape recorder was used to record the experimenter 1 s 
presentation of the experimental rationale during the five-minute dark 
adaptation period. The recordings were used to help determine whether 
the presentation of the rationale was equivalent for each subject. 
After each of the first five subjects were run, the experimenter and 
confederates reviewed the tapes together to determine whether the rat-
ionale had been consistently presented. There was a consensus among 
the experimenter and confederates that these presentations were consist= 
ent with respect to important characteristics like rate of delivery and 
emphasis. For the remaining 13 subjects, tapes were made to be reviewed 
in case either the experimenter or confederates believed that there had 
been a deviation in presentation. This problem never developed. 
The Mach IV scale was employed to identify Highs and Lows (see 
Appendix A). This scale containd 20 items derived from Machiavelli vs 
The Prince and Discourses which are placed in Likert format. Half the 
items are phrased so that endorsement means agreement with Machiavelli, 
while the remaining half are keyed to disagreement. Christie (1970c) 
contended that the scale reflects the degree to which one agrees with 
Machiavelli 1 s views and marshalled experimental evidence that individ-
uals rated high on this dimension are more effective in manipulating 
others and resisting social influence than those rated low. 
Byrne's (1971) Interpersonal Judgment Scale (see Appendix B) was 
used to obtain the subject's ratings of the two confederates on the 
attractiveness and esteem dimensions. The IJS consists of eight items 
placed in Likert format. The order of positiveness if reversed for 
alternating items to counterbalance for acquiescence set (for ::;xample, 
the first choice for item one is "I feel that I would probably like 
this person very much," whereas the first choice for item two is HI 
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believe that this person is, to a great extent, not respected by those 
who know him.") Items one, three, five and seven are scored from seven 
to one points each, while items two, four, six and eight are scored 
from one to seven points each. Scores from items one and eight which 
deal with personal feelings about the ratee and how much the rater 
would like to work with the ratee in an experiment, respectively, are 
summed to provide an attractiveness rating which ranges from 2 to 14 
points. A rating on the esteem dimension was also desired since esteem 
reflects expertise which is believed to be an important factor in a 
person's ability to influence others in this paradigm (Pace & MacNeil, 
1974). Scores from items two and five which deal with respect for the 
ratee and an estimate of his intelligence are summed to provide an 
esteem rating which also ranges from 2 to 14 points (see Tedeschi, 
Schlenker & Bonoma, 1·975). The reamining four items which concern ap-
proval, adjustment, knowledge of current events and morality are used 
as buffer items. 
The Mach V scale (see Appendix C) is a forced-choice version of the 
Mach IV scale which controls for social desirability. Each of the 20 
items on this scale contains three statements: a Machiavellian state= 
ment, a non-Machiavellian statement of equivalent social desirability 
and a non-Machiavellian statement of opposite social desirability. 
Subjects are instructed to indicate the statement most like them and 
least like them. The Mach V scale shares the Mach IV scale's inter-
pretation and criterion validity. Since subjects were found by the 
experimenter to take ten more minutes on the.average to complete this 
scale as opposed to the Mach IV scale, it was judged to be too lengthy 
to administer in the classroom. In order to obtain a Mach V score on 
subjects to provide a second measure of the subject 1 s standing on the 
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Machiavellianism dimension.and to control for social desirability at 
the same time, it was decided to administer the scale as part of the 
debriefing questionnaire. 
The Hex laboratory consists of a light-proof and sound=deadened 
room containing·an experimenter's control room which is screened off 
from the rest of the laboratory, the stimulus apparatus and the subject 
seating area including a table and three chairs. Room dimensions and 
arrangement are shown in Figure 1. The stimulus apparatus (see Figure 
2) was described by Pace and MacNeil (1974): 
The Hex utilizes, in part, the horizontal-vertical illusion 
to create perceptual differences in the apparent distance 
between the points of light (Kunnapas, 1959). The stimulus 
apparatus consists of 13 lights positioned on a vertical 
board in two overlapping hexogonal patterns around a center 
light. Each randomly ordered presentation of the pairs of 
stimulus lights consists of two lights objectively equidist-
ant (15 in.) from trial to trial but with the axes between 
the lights being at a different angle for each contingent 
presentation, thus increasing the differences in Ss' per-
ception (p. 577). 
The stimulus was presented for .5 seconds. The duration between 
trials was 60 seconds. The subjects were positioned 16 feet from the 
Hex stimulus generator in a completely darkened room. Subjects were 
neither allowed to see the room in the light nor told of their distance 
from the stimulus lights. 
The briefing room is adjacent to the Hex laboratory. The room is 
equipped with· a table and four chairs to acommodate the experimenter, 
subject and confederates, a red light for darkadaptation and a black= 
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board used to record the subject's estimate of the average distance 
between the two points of light observed over 30 trials. The briefing 
room is also located adjacent to a classroom which is used as the con-
federates' waiting area. 
The two confederates were both male caucasian undergraduates ages 
18 and 21, respectively. Both scored above the median on the Mach IV 
and Mach V scales. Subjects rated the confederates equivalently with 
respect to judgment accuracy (Doug: 4.2; Rob: 4.1), attractiveness 
(Doug: 10.6; Rob 10.1) and esteem (Doug: 10.5; Rob: 10.0). To reduce 
the likelihood of confounding of the experimental data with experiment~ 
er expectancy effects, both confederates were ignorant of the subjectsu 
standing on the Mach IV scale. 
Each confederate memorized a separate schedule of estimates (see 
Table I) to be given over the 30 trials of the Hex situation. The 
schedules were designed to gradually draw the subject into the range of 
the arbitrary norm (30 to 42 inches). While the confederates 1 estimates 
agreed on the medians for each of the six sets of five trials 3 their 
estimates involved discrpeancies of up to 6 inches on particular trials 
in order to maintain the confederates' credibility as subjects. The 
magnitude of discrepancy gradually decreased over the 30 trials in 
order to subtly increase the p~essure on the subject to conform to the 
confederates' estimates. 
Procedure 
Male and female undergraduate students in Introductory and Social 
Psychology courses were given the Mach IV scale by their respective 
instructors during class. Although only males were used in the exper= 
iment 3 females were included in the classroom administration to prevent 
the development of a sex-related set. The instructors were provided 
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materials and the cover: story that the scale was a Psychology Depart~ 
ment student philosophy survey. The instructors collected the Mach IV 
scales and returned them to the experimenter in privacy. The experiF 
menteL reamined anonymous throughout the procedure so that students 
would not associate the Mach IV scale administration with the subsequ= 
ent Hex situation. 
Twenty-five male subjects (11 Highs and 14 Lows) obtained Mach IV 
scores about one~third of one standard deviation (6.6) above or below 
the sample median (86). These s:µbjects were contacted in class or by 
phone to secure their participation in the experiment. Subjects were 
told that they had been randomly selected from their class rosters to 
insure proper sampling. Eighteen of these subjects (9 Highs and 9 Lows) 
agreed to participate in the experiment in exchange for academic credit 
and were given their choice of testing periods. 
The experimenter led the subject and confederates to the briefing 
room and instructed them to seat themselves at the table. Permission 
was asked to tape the experiment to standardize procedure. Following 
agreement with this request (no one refused), the tape·recorder was 
activated and the participants were given blank cards on which they 
were asked to list their name and instructor. After the cards were 
collected, the participants were informed that the experiment would 
involve making judgments in total darkness and that five=minutes of 
dark adaptation under a red light was required. During this period~ the 
experimenter inquired about each participant's vision and asked those 
wearing watches to remove them so that they would not be distracted by 
the iluminous dials when estimating distances. A rationale was then 
presented verbatim to privide a plausible explanation of the experimentus 
purpose: 
As you may recall, during the Gemini missions the on~board 
navigational equipment broke down several times forcing the 
astronauts to navigate without this equipment. These mal~ 
iunctions alerted NASA to the fact that little was known 
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about the accuracy of human judgments when limited information 
is available. NASA decided to learn more·about the accuracy 
of human judgments by financing research programs across the 
nation like Darklab, using different age groups and both 
sexes. The purpose of Darklab, then, is to test how accurate 
your judgments can be when you are given very limited infor~ 
mation. We don't expect anyone to be one-hundred per cent 
accurate in their judgments. That simply isn't possible. 
But, we do expect many of you to achieve a high degree of 
accuracy when your judgments are made carefully. Because of 
the importance of this problem and the considerable time and 
money that has been invested in this study, we're asking you 
to make each judgment very carefully. We're asking you to 
make each judgment count. 
Following presentation of the rationale, the participants were 
asked if they understood the experiment's purpose (no one raised any 
questions) and then the remainder of the five minutes was spent dis~ 
cussing what the students planned or experienced during Spring break. 
The confederates and the experimenter made this part·of the experiment 
equivalent for each subject by repeating the comments they made spon~ 
taneously in the first testing session in each of the succeeding ses~ 
sions. The exact comments were reviewed by the confederates and the 
experimenter after the first testing session by playing back the tape 
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recording which had been made. At the end of the dark adaptation 
period, each participant was helped to his seat in the Hex laboratory. 
The na)i.ve subject was always placed between the two confederates who 
assJm.,d the same positions each time (see Figure 1). 
When all the participants were seated, the experimenter moved to 
a position directly in front of the naive subject. The participants 
were asked to state their first names in order from their left to right. 
After this was completed, the experimenter asked them to give their 
judgments in the same order throughout the experiment and to speak 
loudly so that their· judgments could be heard over the 11white noisevv of 
the air conditioning. Then, the task instructions were given·verbatim: 
Your task for this stiuation is to give the most accurate 
estimate possible of the distance between two points of 
light·which will appear in thearea in front of you. These 
points of light will appear at various angles and distances 
apart, and you should give your estimate to the nearest even 
inch. These distances are programmed into the machine, and 
the machine to test your alertness occasionally may show you 
just one light or you may hear the warning click and not see 
any light. In these cases you should statealoud~ "one 
light 2" or "no light." Immediately after the two lights dis= 
appear, you should give in order, from your left to right~ 
the most accurate estimate you can of the total distance be-
tween the lights. Give your first name first and then your 
estimate. You will have ample time between the presentation 
of the pairs of lights to give your estimates. Don't hurry, 
but give it quickly and promptly, immediately after the lights 
go out in order from left to right~ giving your first name 
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first and then your estimate. J:.~ then moves to the front of 
the room toward the Hex stimulus generator, stating as he 
does] You will have plenty of time to give your judgment 
oetween the light presentations. We will do it a couple 
of times for practice before we start in. I will show you 
your first pair of lights in a moment. 
The three participants made 30 judgments, in turn, with the subject 
making his judgment after the first confederate each time. The exper~ 
imenter recorded the data as the judgments were given. Following the 
completion of 30 trials, the participants were led back into the brief-
ing room and told that the experimenter needed to get information sep-
arately from each of them after which they would be escorted to separate 
rooms to complete a debriefing questionnaire. The subject was always 
selected as the first person to be debriefed and the confederates were 
seated in the adjoining classroom during his debriefing. The experimet-
er asked the subject to draw the average distance between the two 
points of light on the blank blackboard. Then, the subject was taken 
to a second classroom located in the same basement wing in which the 
questionnaire instructions were explained. The experimenter instructed 
the subject to leave the debriefing questionnaire in the·classroom when 
completed and made certain that the subject had the experimenter's 
name and extension for later reference. The subject was promised a 
complete debriefing in April when the testing would be completed. A 
paragraph describing the experimental hypothesis, designed and findings 
was distributed to the subjects through their classes. 
The experimenter conferred with the confederates in the briefing 
room immediately after each subject was settled in the second classroom. 
80 
The testing session was reviewed with particular emphasis on standard~ 
ization of experimenter and confederate performance. Tape recordings 
were played during the first five review sessions. Since there was a 
consensus among the experimenter and confederates that the performance 
of each was consistent during these testing sessions, subsequent review 
sessions dispensed with listening to the tape. The recordings were 
still made, but were not to be played back unless either the experiment~ 
er or one of the confederates detected a deviation in the presentation 
of the experimental rationale or conversation among the experimenter and 
participants during the dark adaptation period. This problem never 
developed. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
All subjects completed six blocks·of five trials each. Medians 
were computed for each block of trials as the operational definition of 
conformity was the number of judgment medians lying within the range 
of the arbitrary norm (30 to 42 inches). These data were subjected to 
a one-way analysis of variance and Pearson product-moment correlation 
analysis. The mean number of medians within the arbitrary range obtain-
ed by Highs and Lows is displayed in Figure 3 and listed in Table 1. 
The grand mean contributed by all subjects was 4.1 medians within the 
arbitrary range. In what follows, we will examine the results with 
respect to their implications for the experimental hypothesis. 
The findings failed to support the experimental hypothesis. Highs 
obtained a mean of 4.0 medians within the arbitrary range compared to 
the Lows' mean of 4.1 medians. A one-way fixed analysis of variance 
disclosed no main effect attributable to the Machiavellian variable 
(see Table 2)~. Pearson product~rnoment correlation analysis also failed 
to support the hypothesis. Although lying in the predicted direction~ 
correlations between the number of medians falling within .the arbitr-
ary range.and scores on the Mach IV ~nd Mach V scales were nonsignif-
icant (!. (18) = -.14, .P.<•58; !. (18) = -.24, .P. <·66). Alternative 
measures of conformity including the sum of the differences between 
the subjects' judgment medians and the confederates' judgment medians, 
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Figure 3. Conformity as a Function of Machiavellianism 
Table 1 
Mach IV, Mach V, Conformity and Debriefing 
Questionnaire Measures 
Mean S.D. Range 
Mach IV 68.53 3.54 76- 64 = 13 
Mach v 93.33 5.36 100- 87 = 14 
Medians Inside 4.11 2.52 6- 0 = 7 
Self Accuracy 4.78 2.11 7- 2 = 6 
Doug Accuracy 4.56 2.45. 8- 0 = 9 
Low Rob Accuracy 3.78 2.00 6- 0 = 7 
Mach 
Doug Attractiveness 10.22 1.64 13- 8 = 6 
Rob Attractiveness 9.89 2.21 13- 7 = 7 
Doug Esteem 10.33 1.41 12- 7 = 6 
Rob Esteen 9.56 1. 74 12- 7 = 6 
Average Distance 25.22 8.00 35- 15 = 21 
Mach IV 102.44 12. 77 133- 92 = 43 
Mach v 109.78 6.04 122-102 = 21 
Medians Inside 4.00 2.45 6- 0 = 7 
Self Accuracy 4.11 1.36 6- 3 = 4 
Doug Accuracy 3.89 1.83 7- 1 = 7 
High 
Mach Rob Accuracy 4.56 2.07 8- 1 8 
Doug Attractiveness 11.00 1.94 11- 7 = 5 
Rob Attractiveness 10.33 2.35 13- 6 = 8 
Doug Esteem 10.78 1.09 12- 9 = 4 
Rob Esteem 10.44 1.24 12- 8 = 5 
Average Distance 29.67 8.86 49- 21 = 29 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary for Conformity 
Degrees of Sum of 
Source Freedom Squares Mean Square F Ratio p F 
Mach IV 1 1.389 1.389 1.389 
.224 .646 6.181 
Error 16 98.889 6.181 
Total 17 100.278 S.899 
sum of the subjects' ranges and number of subjects' judgment means 
located inside of the arbitrary range were also subjected to a one~way 
analysis of variance and Pearson product-moment correlation analysis. 
None of these measures supported the experimental hypothesis. 
Measures taken from the Mach IV and Mach V scales, the operational 
definition of conformity and the debriefing questionnaire were inter-
correlated using the Pearson product-moment procedure (see Table 3) •' 
Several correlations were found to be significant beyond the .OS level. 
Scores from the Mach IV and Mach V scales were found to be positively 
correlated (E (18) = .88, .E. <.001). The number of medians falling 
inside the arbitrary range was positively related to ratings of Doug 
and Rob (the two confederates) on the dimension of judgment accuracy 
(,I (18) = .67~ .E,<.003; !. (18) =.SS, p_4.019). Ratings of Doug and 
Rob on the accuracy dimension were positively correlated (!, (18) = .47 3 
.E.<·046). Ratings of Doug on the attractiveness dimension were posit-
ively correlated with Rob's attractiveness ratings (! (18) = .69, 
Table 3 
If) 
00 Intercorrelation Matrix 
MACH MACH MEDNS SELF DOUG ROB DOUG ROB DOUG ROB AV. 
IV v INSIDE ACC. ACC. ACC, ATTR. ATTR. ESTEEM ESTEEM DIST. 
MACH IV . 88*~"' -.14 -.16 - .13 .25 .28 • 07 .14 • 03 .34 
MACH V • 88*'•/( -.24 -.16 -.23 .30 .42 .26 .23 .33 .22 
MEDNS INSIDE -.14 -.24 .34 .67** • 55·k - • 05 .24 -.21 -.02 .43 
SELF ACC. -.16 - .16 .34 .26 .36 -.24 -.06 -.39 -.20 .24 
DOUG ACC. - .13 -.23 • 67*-J( .26 .47;'( .21 .21 .13 -.31 .36 
ROB ACC. .23 .30 .56* .36 .• 4 7;'( .17 .44 -.18 .13 .25 
DOUG ATTR. .28 .42 - • 05 -.24 .21 .17 .69** .55* .28 - • 07 
ROB ATTR. • 07 .26 .24 -.06 .21 .44 .69** .21 • 62-J( - .14 
DOUG ESTEEM .14 .23 -.21 -.39 .13 -.18 .55* .21 .34 • 05 
ROB ESTEEM .03 .33 - • 02 -.20 -.31 .13 .28 .62* .34 -.20 
AV. DIST. .34 .22 .43 .24 .36 .25 - • 07 -.14 .05 -.20 
.. k .E. .05 
;'(* .E. • ~1 
8.6 
E. < .002) and Doug's ratings on the esteem dimension (!: (18) = .55, 
.E. "(. Oil.7). Rob's attractiveness ratings were positively correlated with 
his ratings on the esteem dimension(!: (18) = .62, .E.<.006). The 30 
judgment trials were i~tercorrelated with each other using the Pearson 
product-moment correlation statistic. This analysis revealed that the 
number of intercorrelations which ere significant beyond the .05 level 
tended to increase with passing trials. Finally, the lines which the 
subjects had drawn on the blackboard during the debriefing period to 
represent the average distance between the two lights over the JO 
trials were measures and these data were correlated (Pearson product-
moment statistic) with the operational measure of conformity (the number 
of judgment medians lying within the arbitrary range) in order to pro~ 
vide a check on whether conformity had occurred within the paradigm. 
Perhaps due to the crudeness of this measure, a significant correlation 
was not obtained. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the data failed to support the experimental hypo-
thesis: Highs will conform to a lesser degree than Lows within a social 
judgment situation. The finding of no difference between Highs and Lows 
with respect to conformity - as measured by the number of judgment 
medians falling within the range of the arbitrary norm ~ did not uphold 
the contention by Geis and Christis (1970) that Highs are more resist-
and to social influence than Lows. In what follows, the results of 
this investigation will be examined, the appropriateness of the present 
methodology in testing the experimental hypothesis will be considered 
and the broad implications of the reviewed studies and present findings 
for Western philosophy, psychologyand-'political science will be ap-
praised. 
Experimental Findings 
The Hex situation produced a moderate level of conformity as op-
erationally defined by the number of judgment medians lying within the 
range of the arbitrary norm (30 to 42 inches). The grand mean contrib~ 
uted by both Highs and Lows was 4.1 medians within the arbitrary range 
out of a possible 6 medians. This represented a 68 per cent rate of 
conformity as measured by judgment medians. 
There were marked individual differences in degree of conformity 
which were unrelated to scores obtained on the two Machiavellianism 
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scales. The number of judgment medians lying within the arbitrary 
range extended from 0 to 6: four subjects (22%) obtained no judgment 
medians, two subjects (11%) obtained 3 judgment medians, five subjects 
(28%) ·:..btained 5 judgment medians and seven subjects (39%) obtained 6 
judgment medians within the arbitrary range. The moderate level of 
conformity obtained within this paradigm (from 0 to 100 percent) appro-
ached the results which MacNeil (Note 8) observed when he used a ratio 
of four confederates to one naive subject. MacNeil's higher rate of 
conformity (from 77 to 100 per cent) would seem to reflect the larger 
number of confederates used in his investigation (four as opposed to 
two in the present study). 
The 30 judgment trials contributed by each subject were intercor-
related using the Pearson product-moment statistic to determine whether 
any meaningful relationships were present in these data. An examinat-
ion of the number of correlations found to be significant at the .05 
level revealed a noticeable tendency towards increased intercorrelation 
among judgments as the trials progressed. This finding was consistent 
with results from the autokinetic and Hex situations which indicated 
that experimental norms become more stable over successive judgments 
(Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Pace, Note 9). 
Several important findings emerged from the debriefing question-
naire. A strong positive Pearson product-moment correlation (£ (18) = 
.88, .E. <.OOl) was found between the Mach IV and Mach V scales. This 
statistic was appreciably higher than Christie's (1970b) finding of 
.!. (764) = .67, .E. (not provided) •. The difference petween the two 
findings may be due to the substantial difference in sample size and 
selection of subjects from different geographic regions. Both correlat-
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ions revealed a high positive relationships between the two Machiavel~ 
lianism scales suggesting that both scales measured the same variables. 
This interpretation seems consistent with the two factor analytic stud-
ies cL:.ed earlier which .disc.Losed that the scales involved the same 
three content categories (Christie, 1970c). 
The number of judgment medians located inside the arbitrary range 
was found to be positively related to the ratings of the two confederates 
on the dimension of judgment accuracy. Subjects who conformed in this 
situation described both confederates as being more accurate in their 
judgments than did subjects who failed to conform. This finding appears 
to admit several interpretations. First, subjects who conformed may 
have recognized that their distance estimates agreed with those of the 
confederates and subr:;equently rated the confederates favorably on the 
accuracy dimension in order to appear consistent. These subjects may 
have·relied upon their favorable ratings of the confederates to justify 
their own conformity C'I conformed because the· others 1 estimates seemed 
to be very accurate''). This explanation seems particularly reasonable 
since deference to expertise is encouraged in American culture. 
Alternatively, subjects may have judged the confederates to be 
more accurate than themselves and decided to agree with their juµgments 
in order to appear more competent in this situation. This interpretat-
ion was not supported by Pearson product-moment correlation analysis 
of ratings of self and the confederates on the dimension of judgment 
accuracy. Subjects' self-ratings concerned judgment accuracy were 
found to be unrelated to their ratings of the confederates on this 
dimension. If the interpretation were true, a negative correlation 
should have been observed. In the absence of empirical support for 
,9Q 
this interpretation, the first explanation appears to be more credible. 
The two confederates' ratings on the accuracy dimension were posit-
ively correlated as were their ratings on the dimension of attractive~ , 
ness. These findings suggest that the subjects perceived the confed-
erates to be alike with respect to these dimensions. The positi'1e 
correlation between the confederates' accuracy ratings would be expected 
due to the similarity of their estimates. It would have appeared in-
consistent for the subjects to rate the confederates differently on this 
dimension when their judgments were always ~ithin the arbitrary range 
and their judgment medians were always identical. 
The implications of the positive correlation between their attract-
iveness ratings are less obvious. It is possible that this correlation 
reflects the degree to which subjects perceived the confederates as 
conforming to their estimates. Helm (Note 1) concluded that when others 
are perceived as conforming to us there is a tendency to negatively 
evaluate them. Perhpas the confederates were perceived as having con-
formed to the subjects' estimates to a similar degree and were consequ-
ently given equivalent attractiveness ratings. 
A second possibilty is that the confederates were perceived as 
being alike with respect to characteristics like personality and values. 
Since attributions of attractiveness may be based on the degree we per-
ceive others to be like us (Wrightsman~ 1973), the perception that the 
confederates possessed similar personalities and values may have similar 
attractiveness ratings. Unfortunately, the experim~ntal data do not 
provide a basis for choosing one of these explanations in favor of the 
other• 
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Finally, the confederates' ratings on attractiveness and esteem 
were positively correlated. This seems to indicate that attrubutions 
of attractiveness were related to attrubtions of esteem. The Inter~ 
personal Judgment Scale item5 which provide the basis for a rating of 
attraytiveness deal with personal feelings about the ratee and how much 
the rater would like to work with him in an experiment. Those items 
which provide the basis for an esteem rating deal with respect for the 
ratee and an estimate of his intelligence. Given this item content~ it 
seems reasonable to conclude that there was indeed a positive relation~ 
ship between how much the subjects liked the confederates (attractive-
ness) and how much expertise they attributed to them (esteem). 
A Reconsideration of '.Methodology 
Due to the failure of the data to support the experimental hypoth-
esis, it seems appropriate to reexamine the experimental methodology to 
determine whether an appropriate test of the hypothesis was proviede. 
The three areas concerning choice o.f paradigm, procedure and subjects 
will be considered separately. 
Paradigm 
Was the Hex situation appropriate for the investigation of the 
experimental hypothesis? Three criteria were used in the selection of 
a paradigm: (1) The paradigm should possess the ability to produce 
conformity, (2) the paradigm should allow differences in the degree to 
which individuals conform and (3) the paradigm should be robust •. In 
retrospect, how well did the Hex situation satisfy these criteria? In 
wbat follows, each criterion will be individually addressed. 
The data demonstrated that a moderate level of conformity - as 
operationally defined by the number of judgment medians located within 
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the arbitrary range - was obtained using the Hex situation. The grand 
mean contributed by all subjects was 4.1 medians within the arbitrary 
range which represented a conformity rate of 68 per cent. At this 
juncture, it seems appropriate to ask whether this level of conformity 
was due to the successful operation of the paradigm or a strong dis-
position on the part of Highs and Lows to conform. 
The possibility that Highs and Lows were more conforming than the 
undergraduates used to standardize the Hex and autokinetic situations 
merits serious attention. Since Highs and Lows were chosen from the 
upper and lower thirds of a distribution of undergraduate Machiavel-
lianism scores, it cannot be assumed that the two populations were 
identical. Two lines of argument will be raised to dispute the content-
ion that Highs and Lows were more conforming than the standardization 
populations. 
First, if Highs and Lows were particularly disposed toward con-
formity in situations such as the Hex, there should have been a con-
sisten-t tendency for their judgments to fall within the arbitrary range. 
This homogeneity of judgments would seem to be the logical consequence 
of assuming that Highs and Lo~s are strongly conforming. While a mod-
erate rate of conformity was observed for Highs and Lows overall, 
there were substantial individual differe,nces in the degree of conform-
ity observed. Four of the subjects (22%) conformed in none of their 
judgment medians. Another two subjects (11%) conformed in only half of 
their judgment medians. This means that one-third of all Highs and 
Lows conformed in half of their judgment medians or less. These indiv~ 
idual differences in degree of conformity indicate that there was 
marked heterogeneity in Highs' and Lows' judgments in the Hex situation. 
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This finding seems contradictory to the contention that Highs and Lows 
were more conforming than the standardization populations. 
Second, the resistance to social influence literature provides no 
support for the position that both Highs and Lows should be more·con= 
forming than ordinary undergraduates. While several of these studies 
must be interpreted cautiously because of the use of a before-after 
design, the literature indicates that only Lows should be expected to 
be strongly conforming due to their hypothesized emotional' involvement 
and trust of others (Geis & Christie, 1970). Thus, the contention that 
Highs and Lows were more conforming tban the standardization populations 
seems neither to be supported by the experimental data nor the resist= 
ance to social influence studies. While the contention cannot be con= 
elusively ruled out~ both the data and cited literature render it 
unlikely. 
Did the paradigm allow differences in the degree to which individ-
uals conformed? This question may be answered affirmatively. In the 
discussion of the first criterion, it was reported that one=third of 
the subjects conformed in three judgment medians or less while the·re= 
maining two-thirds conformed in five judgment medians or more. This 
heterogeneity in distance estimates provides definite evidence that 
individual differences in degree of conformity were permitted in the 
H~x situation. 
Was the paradigm robust? Robustness is believed to be an inherent 
property of a judgment situation which is related to the degree of 
stimulus structure which is present (MacNeil, Note 6)0 As noted in the 
earlier comparison of the Hex with the autokinetic situation, the Hex 
was judged to be a more robust paradigm due to its slightly greater 
94 
degrees pf sti~uius structure (Pace & MacNeil, 1974). Since the pro~ 
cedure by which the Hex was administered did not appear to alter the 
degree of structure present in this stimulus situation, there would 
seem to be no basis for questioning its robustness. 
Procedure 
'.l;'he main procedural question concerns whether a separate retest-
ing of each subject was needed to verify that conformity - as opposed 
to compliance - had been obtained in the Hex situation. While this 
question was addressed earlier during a discussion of procedural issuesll 
it may be answered more completely now using data from the debriefing 
period. 
First, it should be noted that a crude measure of the subjects' 
private perceptions of the average distance between the pairs of lights 
was obtained during the debriefing session. Subjects were asked to 
draw this distance on a blank blackboard. Unfortunately, this measure 
did not correlate with the subjects 1 estimates of distance during the 
30 judgment trials. The failure to obtain a significant Pearson pro-
duct=.moment correlation between these measures appeared to be due to 
the imprecision involved in requiring subjects to translate their 
guesses about what the average distance between the pairs of light 
actually was into a line· drawn free-hand on the blackboard. 
Was the use of a more dependable verification procedure warrented? 
The position advanced in the earlier discussion of procedure was that 
retesting the subjects by themselves involved a trade~off of double 
testing time for the advantage of verification. It was argued that 
the matter rested on the necessity for verification. The experimental 
norm formation literature was cited to show that verification was 
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unnecessary. The marshalled literature supported the view that the 
pro~ess of conformity is inherent in situations which possess a low 
order of stimulus structure (Sherif & Sherif, 1969) and that the Hex 
situation, which possesses a low degree of stimulus structure (Pace & 
MacNeil, 1974), has been shown to produce the persistent social norms 
characteristic of conformity (Gregory, Note 5). 
The data obtained during the debriefing period supports the view 
that conformity was the operative process in the present study. Four= 
teen of the subjects in the present investigation told the experimenter 
that they had a low degree of confidence in their judgments. A fre= 
quently encounted comment was that iulf only I knew how far I was from 
the lights, I could have made accurate judgments." The subjects 1 
comments about their uncertainty was consistent with their answers on 
the de~riefing questionnaire. Subjects were asked to rate their con= 
fidence during each half (15 trials) by slashing a nine=inch li.ne 
(~._,.~~~~~). This procedure allowed subjects to rate their con= 
fidence from 0 to 9. The average confidence rating was 3.7 for the 
first half and 4.6 for the second half. This low order of confidence 
in the accuracy of their judgments is what would be expected where a 
conformity process is present. For in a conformity situation~ the 
subjects would'. be quite uncertain as to how the stimulus situa.tion 
should be patterned. This is in sharp contrast to the canpliance pro= 
cess found in the Asch (1951) situation where the majority of subjects 
knew what the correct answer should be. 
The increased self=rating on confidence in the second half would 
appear to reflect the stabilization of the subjects' judgments. The 
tendency of experimental social norms to stabilize with succeeding 
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trials has been previously observed in the autokinetic situation 
(Sherif, 1935) and the Hex paradigm (MacNeil, Note 8). 
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To summarize at this point, the experimental norm formation lit-
erature and data obtained during the debriefing period support the pos~ 
ition that conformity was the operative process in the present study. 
On these grounds, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the re~ 
testing of the subjects for the purpose of verifying the presence of 
conformity was of doubtful necessity. 
· Subjects 
Two questions concerning the adequacy of criterion scores and the 
participants' motivation will be addressed in this section. First, 
did the criterion scores properly define Highs and Lows. While a re-
view of the Machiavellianism literature reveals the absence of a con~ 
sensus concerning how Highs and Lows should be defined, one procedure 
has been employed with considerable success. In this approach, subjects 
are given the Mach IV and Mach V s9ales and the resulting score distri~ 
bution is partitioned into thirds. Highs are defined by scores lying 
in the upper third, while Lows are defined by scores located in the 
lower third. This approach was used in both the Geis (1970) and ~ 
Christie and Geis (1970a) studies. These studies successfully obtained 
differences between Highs and Lows with respect to manipulative behav~ 
ior with coalition bargaining situations. Since this definitional 
strategy was found to be successful in these studies, there is no 
reason to presume that its adoption in the present study lead to mis= 
classification of subjects. 
The second question concerns whether the subjects were .motivated 
in the Hex situation. For a proper test of the experimental hypothesis, 
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it was necessary that the subjects take the judgment task seriously. 
Both the judgment trials and the debriefing sessions provided evidence 
that the subjects were strongly motivated in the Hex situation. During 
the judgment trials both the experimenter and confederates observed 
that the subjects - without exception - were strongly attentive and in-
volved in estimating the distances. In the debriefing sessions, each 
subject requested f1eedback on his performance. Ten of the subjects 
thanked the experimenter for the opportunity to participate in an in-
teresting experiment. Twelve subjects inquired about how soon the ex-
perimental results would be made available to them. These data seemed 
to support the interpretation that subjects took the Hex situation 
very seriously and were strongly motivated to estimate the distances 
as accurately as they could. 
The experimental findings have now been examined and the approp-
riateness of the present methodology in testing the experimental hypo-
thesis considered. The reconsideration of the experimental methodology 
supported the conclusion that the hypothesis was honestly tested. In 
the remainder of this chapter, the broad implications of the reviewed 
literature and the present findings for Western philosophy, psychology 
and political science will be appraised. 
Implications for Western Philosophy 
Machiavelli made an invaluable contribution to Western philosophy 
when he disputed traditional idealism concerning man's nature. In 
place of an idealistic view of man's basic goodness, he offered his 
own realpolitik. In Chapter 17 of The Prince he wrote: "For touching 
men, wee may say this in general, they are unthankful, unconstant 
dissemblers, they avoyd danger, and are covetous of gaine" (p. 62). 
Empirical findings have· been reviewed which sustain Machiavelli's 
description of man's dishonesty, lack of courage, gullibility and 
ambition. 
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Studies by Exline et al. (1970) and Bogart et al. (1970) provided 
evidence of man's dishonesty. In the first situation, 38 out of 42 
subjects acquiesced to a confederate's cheating, while in the second, 
29 out of 61 subjects accepted the confederate's offer of stolen an-
swers. In each situation, the subgect:' s acquiescence· or collaboration 
in cheating rendered completion of the experimental task easier. 
Ironically, Lows appeared to be less honest than Highs in these 
situations. While Lows endorsed conventional values such as honesty, 
their rates of acquiescence and collaboration were identical to those 
of Highs who tended to reject these values. Highs seemed to be con-
siderably more candid than Lows about their dishonesty. 
The problem of man's courage was indirectly addressed by the 
Exline et al. (1970), Asch (1951) and Crutchfield (1955) investigations. 
The confederate in the Exline et al. (1970) situation searched about 
the room and located the answers to the experimental task. Following 
this, he wrote the answers down on scratch paper and recited the answers 
aloud. Each of the 42 subjects could have restrained the confederate 
by persu~sion or force, informed the experimenter of the cheating or 
asked to withdraw from the experiment. While the subjects' acquiescence 
seemed to refiect self-interest, it may also have been due to fear that 
resistance would offend or anger the confederate who was a peer. In 
all, only 4 of 42 subjects resisted the confederate's· implication 
attempts. 
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In the Asch (1951) and Crutchfield (1955) compliance situations, 
subjects were pressured to report judgments which contradicted objective 
visual evidence. Post-experimental questioning in the Asch (1951) 
situation revealed that a majority of subjects complied with the. major-
ity on critical trials "while· still believing that the majority answer 
was wrong. The frequent explanation of compliance was that the subject 
found it uncomfortable to oppose the majority verdict. Thrity-two 
per cent of all judgments on critical trials complied with the majority. 
This finding suggests that the subjects lacked the courage to defend 
the accuracy of their personal judgments. The same conclusion seems to 
be appropriate in the Crutchfield (1955) situation which contained an 
equivalent degree of stimulus structure •. In the Crutchfield situation, 
subjects complied with a fictitious majority on 38% of the critical 
trials. The high degree of stimulus structure which was present in 
this situation rendered it likely that many subjects complied with 
majority answers which contradicted their personal judgments. 
Human gullibility was documented in several investigations of 
social judgment (Asch, 1951; Crutchfield, 1955; Sherif, 1935, MacNeil, 
Note 8). There is evidence that a minority. of subjects in both the 
Asch and Crutchfield situations actually perceived the false answer as 
being correct despite the fact that this answer contradicted objective 
visual data (Wrightsman, 1973). Considerably more dramatic perceptual 
errors were obtained in the autokinetic and Hex situations. In the 
autokinetic situation, subjects have been influenced to perceive move-
ments exceeding 18 inches despite the fact that the point of light is 
actually stationary. Likewise, subjects facing the Hex situation 
perceived the light pairs as lying at varying distances apart (exceeding 
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42 inches in some cases), although the light pairs were always 15 
inches apa:;i+t. 
The present study may be conceptualized as a test of Machiavelli's 
contention that men are gullible. All subjects reported that the light 
pairs were arranged at different distances apart. Overall, a 68% rate 
of conformity was obtained with respect to the confederates 1 judgments. 
Sixteen of the subaects provided no evidence of suspicion concerning 
the experiment and half of the subjects who conformed denied that their 
estimates had been influenced by the judgments of the·confederates. 
These findings appear to support the view that men are gullible. 
Finally, Geis et al. (1970) uncovered evidence of man's ambition. 
Both Highs and Lows were instructed to administer a personality test 
to another subject. Since a previous experimenter had perpetrated 
min.or deceptions during a previous t.esting, the subjects were told that 
they could use their power of administration arbitrarily. While Highs 
surpassed Lows in sheer number, variety and innovativeness of manipul-
ations, both Highs and Lows each perfomred an impressive number of 
manipulations. The finding of widespread offensive manipulations with-
in this situation may be interpreted to mean that most subjects sought 
to exercise power over others. Again, while Lows tend to condemn 
manipulative behavior within this paradigm contradicted their stated 
beliefs. Highs, on the other hand, are very candid on the Machiavel-
lian.ism scales in endorsing the manipulative behavior which they seem 
to enjoy. 
Empirical evidence has been marshalled to support Machiavelli's 
uncharitable description of man. There appeared to be satisfactory 
evidence to demonstrate that men are dishones.t, cowardly, gullible at).d 
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ambitious in social psychological situations. Highs appeared to be 
Lmore candid than Lows concerning their dishonesty and ambition. Where-
as Lows tended to describe themselves as being conventionally virtuous, 
their actions often contradicted this self-description. 
Implications for Psychology 
The empirical findings reviewed in chapters one and three possess 
important implications for both personality and social psychology. The 
contribution of these data to personality psychology lies in their 
documentation of a Machiavellian personality characterized by manip-
ulation, selective resistance to social influence and concern regard-
ing the appearance of consistency in attitudes and judgments. 
The social manipulation literature (Geis et al., 1970; Geis, 1970; 
Christie & Geis, 1970a) demonstrated that Highs are quite successful 
in manipulating others when their interactions are face-to-face, allow 
for improvisation and permit affective arousal in others. In the Geis 
et al. (1970) situation, Highs were considerable more effective than 
Lows in distracting subjects to whom they were administering a person-
ality test. Similarly, Highs proved to be extremely successful bargain-
ers in two coalition bargaining games (Geis, 1970; Christie & Geis, 
1970a) in which the outcomes were points and cash, respectively. The 
effectiveness of the Machiavellian in manipulating others seems to be 
well established. 
The resistance to social influence literature may be interpreted 
to show that Highs selectivity resist social influence when an agent 
of deliberate social influence attempts can be identified and the High 
possesses motivation to resist these attempts. In both the Exline et 
al. (1970) and Bogart et al. (1970) situations, Highs did not resist 
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implication in cheating more effectively than Lows. Their rates of ac~ 
quiescence and collaboration were identical in these paradigms. These 
findings were not surprising since· acquiescence· and collaborator apr .. 
peared to be in both Highs' and Lows' self-interest. But in the Exline 
et al. (1970) situation, Highs differed from Lows in their· rate of con-
fession. It seems likely that in the interrogation phase of the paradigm 
where the influence agent was clearly identified and where compliance 
with the agent's demand for a. confession contained the risk of reprisal, 
the preconditions for Highs' resistance to social influence were satis-
fied and consequently Highs confessed less often than Lows and sustained 
longer eye contact ~ith their interrogator while maintaining their in-
nocence. 
The idea of preconditions to resistance to social influence would 
seem capable of explaining the finding in the present study of no dif-
ference between Highs and Lows in terms of resistance to conformity. 
It seems likely that Highs did not perceive the-confederates as delib-
erately attempting to influence them. Eight of the nine Highs expres-
sed no suspicion regarding either the experimenter·or the confederates. 
Further, Highs did not appear to possess motivation to resist the con-
formity process. No salient outcomes could be won by disagreement 
with the confederates' estimates. Since neither of the two precondit-
ions to resistance to social pressure appear to be present in the par-
adigm, the finding that Highs conformed as readily as Lows seems pre-
dictable. Thus, the failure of the paradigm to obtain differences 
between Highs and Lows with respect to conformity does not warrant the 
conclusion that 11the worng end of Machiavellianism was tested," rather, 
it demonstrates that Highs are selet:tive as to the circumstances in 
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which they resist social influence. 
This interpretation allows prediction of Highs' behavior in com-
pliance paraqigms as well. It seems reasonable to predict that in 
situations such as the Asch (1951) or Crutchfield (1955) paradigms, 
Highs wou~d neither be able to identify a deliberate agent of influence 
or would find the outcomes· of resistance to compliance pressures per-
sonally salient. Therefore, it is predicted that Highs might adopt 
the majority verdict as a course of least resistance. Empirical in-
vestigation of this prediction would seem to be in order. In addition 
to a standard administration of these situations, variations could be 
devised which served to manipulate the perceived deliberateness of the 
influence agents and the salience of the outcomes (perhaps cash rewards 
could be promised for accurate judgments). Such variations in the 
standard Asch (1951) and Crutchfield (1955) situations would seem able 
to provide an appropriate test of the preconditions to resistance 
hypothesis. 
Several studies (Harris, Note 2; Geis et al., Note 3; Feiler, 
Note 4; Jones et al., 1962) provided, evidence that the Machiavellian 
personality possesses a third characteristic of concern regarding the 
appearance of consistency in social communications. In the Harris 
(Note 2) situation, subjects rated protagonists alone and then jointly 
with a partner. Harris discovered that Highs changed their ratings. 
considerably less than Lows following interaction with a partner. This 
means that Highs' communicated judgments were quite consistent. In the 
Geis et al. (Note 3) paradigm, attitude measures were taken and then 
subjects discussed a counter-attitudinal position within a group. A 
second attitude measurement was taken following the group discussion. 
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Again~ Highs' communicated attitudes were very consistent while Lows 
exhibited an attitudinal shift. The same before-after design was used 
in the Feiler (Note 4) paradigm except that debates were substituted 
for group discussions. Feiler discovered that Highs' communicated 
attitudes remained consistent even after counter-attitudinal advocacy, 
while Lows tended to shift their·attitudes. ·Finally, Jones et al. 
(1962) obtained self-descriptions from subtjects and then had an inter-
viewer furnish them with negative feedback about their personalities. 
Highs' self-descritpions did not change·when the subjects subsequent'ly 
described themsetves to a second interviewer, whereas Lows tended to 
describe themselves more favorably. 
While the use·of a before-after design in these studies necessit-
ates a cautious interpretation of their findings, there seems to be a 
definite pattern of results which suggests that Highs are more concern-
ed than Lows about appearing consistent in their social communications. 
When Highs are conceptualized·. as social manipulators, their· concern 
for the appearance of consistency becomes apparent. Consistency in 
social communications is believed to enhance an individual's perceived 
credibility and consequently increases his persuasiveness (Helm, Note 
1). Since Highs are characterized as being greatly concerned about the 
successful exercise of interpersonal influence, the·appearance of con-
sistency in their social communications would seem to be a particularly 
salient issue for them. 
The empirical support for the·concept of a Machiavellian person-
ality has been examined. The Machiavellian was shown to be successful 
in the manipulation of others when interaction was face-ta~face, allowed 
improvisation .and permitted the arousal of others' emotions. The 
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Machiavellian was characterized as being selective in his resistance 
to social influence. Resistance was predicted only when a deliberate 
agent of manipulation could be identified and the outcome of resist-
ance was personally salient. Finally, the Machiavellian was described 
as being concerned about the·appearance of consistency in his social 
communications. The appearance 0£ consistency seemed important to him 
because it is theorized to increase an influence source's credibility 
and consequently his persuasiveness. 
The Machiavellian literature· also possesses important implications 
for social psychology in the areas of social manipulation and resist-
ance to social influence. The problem of social manipulation will be 
considered first. The preconditions postulated for the Machiavellian's 
effective manipulation of others would appear to apply to social inter-
actions in general. The successful influence source could be expected 
to achieve the most effectiveness when he· can interact with the influence 
target on a face-to-face basis, improvise his communications and e:notion-
ally arouse the influence target. Face-to-face interaction would pro-
vide the influence source with valuable data about his target (includ-
ing feedback on the success of him manipulative efforts), increase the 
emotional impact of the influence message·and provide him with a captive 
audience for his communications. Lattitude for improvisation would 
allow the influence source to adjust his influence messages to achieve 
maximum impact on the basis·of feedback provided through face-to~iace 
interaction •. Finally, the arousal of the influence target's emotions 
{iear for example) would function to reduce the target 1 s rational . 
analysis·of the source's influence communications consequently increas-
ing the target's vulnerability to the source's communications. 
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The empirical findings·of the resistance to social influence lit-
erature also seem to be applicable to the problems of conformity and 
compliance in social influence situations. Two preconditions were 
postulated for effective resistance to social influence. First" the 
influence target has·to be identified. Second, resistance to perceived 
influence attempts must possess outcomes salient to the influence 
target. These preconditions would seem to apply to the interpersonal 
influence processes in general. . It seems reasonable·to content that 
in.all cases of interpersonal interaction, a person must first be 
aware that he is the target of deliberate influence communications be-
fore he can proceed to resist. Further, in order to resist perceived 
influence messages the individual must possess sufficient motivation. 
The gains associated with·resistance must greatly outweigh the costs of 
resistance or else the subject will have no reason to pursue this course 
of action. Presumably in both·compliance and conformity situations, 
subjects submitted to social pressure because a deliberate influence 
agent could not be identified nor did the gains from opposing the 
majority appear to outweigh the perceived costs. 
In summary~ the discussion of the preconditions for the Machiavel-
lian 's effecitve manipulation of others and resistance to social in-
fluence appears to be acceptable to interpersonal influence situations 
in general. It is believed that effective manipulation requires the 
elements of face~to-face interaction, lattitude for imporvisation and 
the arousal of an opponent's emotions. Further, the necessary precon-
ditions· for resistance to the influence attempts of others appear to 
be the·identific.ation of a deliberate agent of attempted influence and 
salient outcomes to motivate resistance·efforts. It was argued that 
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the findings observed in both compliance and conformity situations 
could be explained through this hypothesis. Thus, both the social 
manipulation and resistance to social influence literature appear to 
possess important implications for both personality and social psychol-
ogy. 
Im,Elications for Political Science 
The empirical findings of the literature dealing with Machiavel-
lianism and the social influence processes appear to possess consider-
able relevance for the discipline of political science. The most sig-
nificant contributions of this literature concern the management of the 
public's impressions concerning personalities and issues. In what 
follows, the danger of abuse in the management of the public's impres-
sions will be discussed along with possible sources of correction. 
Empirical evidence has been marshalled to demonstrate that when 
stimulus situations lack structure individuals are particularly vul-
nerable to social influence messages which of fer a means of patterning 
their experience. The greater the absence of structure, the more 
receptive the individual is to persuasive messages. Moreover, it has 
been argued that individuals do not resist attempts to influence them 
when an agent of deliberate influence attempts·cannot be identified 
nor when the influence target lacks motivation to engagein resisting 
behavior. 'Ihese observations appear to be directly applicable to the 
problem of managing the public's impressions about personalities and 
issues. 
Political candidates ranging from aldermen to Presidents win and 
maintain office through the management of the public's impressions. 
Public relations firms can·effectively pattern the public's perceptions 
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about a candidate because the political arena is characterized by· a low 
order of stimulus structu~e. Voters are rarely informed about the 
candidate's voting record, private interest commitments and sources of 
finance. the most salient information to the voters. in patterning their 
impressions of candidates are the aspirants' party affiliation and media 
exposure. The calculated manipulation of the media to gain name-regocn-
ition and a favorable image is also made possible by the voter's failure 
to perceive himself as a ta.rget of influence and his· lack of motivation 
to resist attempts to pattern his political impressions. Since the 
voter seldom perceives the politician's media campaign·as a deliberate 
attempt to influence him, personally, he is not disposed toward resist• 
ing these influence messages. This appears to be especially true in 
the· case of· incumbents who skillfully use the media during noncampaign 
periods to shape the voters 1 impressions regarding their performance. 
Further, the voter's lack of motivation to investigate the politician's 
claims·adds to his vulnerability to impression management through manip-
ulation of the media. The American political process seems to be char-
acterized by the election of a serieJ of orchestrated images to political 
office which are often greatly discrepant from the men they represent. 
Political issues are as uns~uctureµ a stimulus for voters as 
political personalities. Issuersuch as bussing are extemely complex 
/ 
for social science experts to )attern, let alone for the uninformed 
voter. Since the public is :'ikely to be poorly informed about the ob-
jective facts underlying a~iven issue, emotional responses become an 
influ'ential basis for pat;:ernirig their perceptions of the issue which 
also serves to insulatethe individuals from appeals to reason. Polit-
icians often attempt ~ use emotion-charged issues in their campaigns 
i 
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to gain or remain in office in order to present themselves favorably 
or discredit an opponent. The deliberate arousal of the voter's emot-
, ions renders him more vulnerable to social influence communications 
since this approach provides a simple means of patterning.a complex 
stimulus (the issue) and simultaneously reduces the voter's reliance 
on reason •. Again, the effectiveness of this practice is aided by the 
voter's lack of awareness that his impressions are being deliberately 
manipulated and his lack of motivation to check out the objective data 
underlying the issue. 
The policical systme's defense against this pervasive practice 
of impression management would seem to lie in legislation which polices 
political finances and fairness of media advertising, and the·efforts 
by the media and public interest groups to informtha.public about can-
didates and issues. Legislation which compels candidates to publish 
their·sources·of income provides the public with more objective data 
with which to pattern their impressions about these·individuals. Like-
wise,. legislation which monitors the·candidates' use of the media 
during campaigns promises to reduce the·likelihood of media programs 
calculated to manipulate the public's fears or prejudices. These re-
forms promise to make it harder for politicians to cause the public 
to pattern their perceptions·of personalities and issues through·emot-
ional responses. 
The media and public interest groups can contribute to the welfare 
of the political system by informing the public about candidates and 
issues and providing alternative ways of patterning political experience. 
The more opjective data the public acquires, the less ambiguous the 
political arena becomes and the less vulnerable the public will be to 
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calcualted attempts to manipulate their impressions. A. second contri-
bution both the media and public interest groups can make is to provide 
alternative ways for the public to pattern their political experience. 
The availability of alternatives to an Administration position or a 
candidate's platform renders the public less dependent upon Washington 
or·a given political figure in reaching their·opinions. A valuable 
outgrowth· of informing the public and providing alternative ways of 
patterning poli~ical experience is that the public may become sensit-
ized to the deliberate efforts made to influence their impressions. 
Awareness of calculated influence attempts renders the public more 
resistant to them. 
Does the defense of the political system ultimately rest with the 
media and public interest groups? No. While both the media and public 
interest groups serve a checks-and-balances function in the American 
political system, both are capable of the same abuses which have been 
condemned in this discussion. Such abuses can be witnessed in an anti-
Nixon press or the blind advocacy of legislation by environmental groups 
which could be economically disastrous to the nation. The ultimate 
defense of the American political system appears to rest in the checks 
and balances produced by a diffusion of political power throughout the 
·entire political system. This diffusion forces congressmen and journ-
·alists alike to compete for the public's attention and confidence, pre-
·culding the development of monoplies of political influence in the 
nation as a whole. 
1he implications of the Machiavellianand social influence lit-
erature for Western philosophy 1 psychology and political science have 
been considered. In the discipline of philosophy, the problem of man's 
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nature was addressed. The literature provided empirical support for 
Machiavelli's view that man is dishonest, cowardly, gullible and ambit-
ious. The implications of the literature for personality psychology 
concerned support for a Machiavellian personality characterized by 
successful manipulation, selective resistance to social influence and 
theappearance of consistency, while its implications for social psych-
ology concern the preconditions for effective social influence and 
resistance to interpersonal influence attempts. Finally, the literat-
ure's implications for political science were considered. The problem 
of the calculated management of the voting public's impressions of per-
sonalities and issues was addressed 'along with the political system's 
defenses against these abuses. The contributions of the Machiavellian 
and social influence literature to human thought appear to be diverse 
and invaluable. 
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Student Name Sex Phone Number 
Instructor Name 
Student Philosophy Survey 
Instructions 
Participation in this survey is·; completely optional. These items 
sample student philosophies about the nature of man and society. Please 
write your name and instructor at the top of this page. Answer all 
items and place your answer--which will be a number from 1 to 7--in the 
blank provided at the right of each question. Your responses will be 
help in strict confidence. Results will be made available through your 
instructor. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is 
useful to do so. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no 9p:i,nion, (3) §lightly disagree; ·(2:) somewhfl,t disagree~. 
(1) §trongly disagree. 
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to 
hear. 
("'7)"°strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
Most people are basically good and kind. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion,. (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it 
will come out when they are given a chance. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree 
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7. There is no excuse for lying to someone. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
8. Generally speaking, men won't work unless they're forced to do so. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, .(3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and 
dishonest. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give 
the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which 
might carry more weight. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
11. Most people who get ahead in th~ world lead clean, moral lives. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is 
that criminals are stupid enough to get caught. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
14. Most men are brave. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
15. It is wise to flatter important people. 
16. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
It is possible to be good in all respects. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
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Barnum was very wrong when he said that there's a sucker born every 
minute. 
(1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, 
(7) strongly disagree. 
It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of 
being put painlessly to death. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
Men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of 
their property. 
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, 
(4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(1) strongly disagree. 
APPENDIX .B 
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERPERSONAL 
JUDGMENT SCALE 
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(Name) (Age, Years-Months) 
(Address) (Phone Number) 
1. Was it difficult to estimate the distance between the lights? 
(Check below) 
In general ? Yes No 
In the first half 7 Yes No 
In the second half? Yes No 
(Date) 
2. Did you use any method or device of your own to make more accurate 
estimates? 
Yes No If yes, what did you use or do? 
3. How confident were you in your judgment of the distance between 
lights? 
(Draw a slashed line through each of the lines below indicating 
your degree of confidence) 
In the first half: 
In the second half: 
4. Did the estimates given by the other person influence your judg-
ments? (Check below) 
Yes No If yes, in which half the most? 
(Check one) First half 
---
Second half 
5. What was the most frequent distance between the lights, and what 
was the average distance in each session? What was the least dis-
tance and what was the greatest distance between the lights? 
First half: most frequent distance 
---inches, least distance 
est distance inches. 
Second half: most frequent distance __ _ 
inches, least distance 
est distance inches. 
inches, average distance 
inches, and great-
inches, average distance 
inches, and great-
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6. Did the estimations of the other person made it very easy, or very 
difficult for you to make your estimates accurately? Draw a slashed 
line through each of the lines below indicating how easy or difot -·· 
ficult, in each session. 
First half: Very easy Very difficult 
--------------------~------
Second half: Very easy---~--------------Very difficult 
7. How accurate were your own estimates? How accurate were the other 
person's estimates? (Draw a slash through each• of i:he 'lines below 
indicating your degree of accuracy) 
Your estimates: 
Very inaccurate ___ ~---------------------very accurate 
Very inaccurate---------------------------~· Very accurate 
Other person's estimates: 
Very inaccurate-------------------------Very accurate 
8. Please rate the other person as accurately as possible on the fol-
lowing items: 
(1) Personal Feelings (check one) 
---
I feel that I would probably like this person very much. 
---
I feel that I would probably like thb person. 
---
I feel that I would probably like this person to a slight 
degree. 
---
I feel that I would probably neither particularly~like 
nor particularly dislike this person. 
---
I feel that I would probably dislike this person to a 
slight degree. 
---
I feel that I would probably dislike this person. 
---
I feel that I would probably dislike this person very much. 
(2) Respect (check one) 
---
I believe that this person is, to a great extent, not 
respected by those whb know him. 
I believe that this person is not. respected by those who 
know him. 
I believe that this person is, to a slight degree, not 
respected by those who know him. 
I believe that this person is neither particularly respec-
ted nor not respected by those who know him. 
I beleive that this person is, to a slight degree, re-
spected by those who know hii:n. 
I believe that this person is, to a great extent, resp-
ected by those who know him. 
(3) 
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Approval (check one) 
I believe that this person is highly approved of by those 
who know· him•· 
I believe that this person is approved of by those who 
khow him. 
I believe that this person is slightly approved of by 
those who know him. 
I believe that this person is neither particularly approv ... _ 
ed nor disapproved of by those who know him. 
I believe that this person is slightly disapproved of by 
those who know him. 
I believe that this person is disapproved of by those 
who know him. 
I believe that this person is highly disapproved of by 
those who know him. 
(4). Adjustment (check one) 
I believe that this person is extremely maladjusted. 
I believe that this person is maladjusted. 
I believe that this person is maladjusted to a slight 
degree. 
I believe that this person is neither particularly mal-
adjusted nor well adjusted. 
I believe that this pe~son is well adjusted to a slight 
degree. 
I believe that this person is well a~justed. 
~---- I believe that this person is extremely well adjusted. 
(5) Intelligence (check one) 
I believe that this person is very much above average in 
intelligence. 
I believe that this person is above average in intellig~ 
ence. 
I believe that this person is slightly above average in 
intelligence. 
I believe that this person is average in intelligence. 
I believe that this person is slightly below average in 
intelligence. 
I believe that this person is below average in intellig-
ence. 
~~- I believe that this person is very much below average in 
intelligence. 
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(6) Knowle~ge of current events (check one) 
---
---
I believe that this person is very much below average in 
his knowledge of current events. 
I believe that this person is below·average in his know-
ledge of current events. 
I believe that this person is slightly below average in 
his knowledge of current events. 
I believe that this person is average in his knowledge of 
current events. 
I believe that this person is slightly above average in 
his knowledge of current events. 
I believe that this person is above average in his know-
ledge of current events. 
I believe that this person is very much above average in 
his knowledge of current events. 
(7) Morality (check one) 
This person impresses me·as being extremely moral. 
This person impresses me as being moral. 
This person impresses me as beinglmoral to a slight degree. 
This person impresses me as being neither particularly 
moral nor particularly immoral. 
This person impresses me as being immoral to a slight 
degree. 
This person impresses me as being immoral. 
This person impresses me as being extremely immoral. 
(8) Working together in an experiment (check one) 
I believe that I would very much dislike working with this 
person in an experiment. 
I believe that I would< dislike working with this person 
in an experiment. 
I believe that I would dislike working with this person 
in an experiment to a slight degree. 
I believe that I would neither particularly dislike nor 
particularly like working with this person in an exper-
iment. 
I believe that I would enjoy working with this person in 
an experiment to a.slight degree. 
I believe that I would enjoy working with this person in 
an experiment. 
I believe that I would _very much like working with this 
person in an experiment. 
9. Write in a sentence or two any unusual experiment you had during 
the session or write any comments you would like to offer. 
10. Draw the length of the average distance between the lights on the 
blackboard. 
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Name Sex Phone Number Instructor Name 
Instructions 
Please answer all items. Indicate for each of the 20 items, the 
statement most like you with a (+) and the st;.t';ment least like you 
with a (-). For example: 
1. A. 
B. 
+ c. 
Your answers will be held in strictest confidence. Results will 
be made available through your instructor. 
1. A. It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than 
a successful business man. 
B. The phrase, i•the road to hell is paved with good intentions" 
contains a lot of truth. 
C. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than 
the loss of their property. 
2. A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with 
the clothes their wives wear. 
B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in 
children be cultivated. 
C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the 
choice of being put painlessly to death. 
3. A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless 
it is useful to do .so. 
B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should 
be worked for before anything else. 
c. Since most people don't know what they want, it is only 
reasonable for ambitious people to talk them into doing 
things. 
4. A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is 
bad for our country. 
B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they 
want to hear. 
c. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others 
less fortunate than themsleves. 
5. A. Most people are basically good and kind. 
B. The best criteria for a wife ot hush.and .. is compatibil;i,ty.:;.,.; 
other characteristics ~re nice but ·not essential. 
C. Only~after a man has gotten what he wants from life should 
he concern himself with the injustices in the world. 
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6. A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral 
lives. 
B. Any man worth his salt shouldn't be blamed for putting his 
career above his family. 
C. People would be better off if they were concerned less 
with how to do things and more with what to do. 
7. A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions 
rather than gives explicit answers. 
B. When you ask someone to do something, it is best to give 
the real reasons for wanting it than giving reasons which 
might carry more weight. 
C. A person's job is the best single guide as to the sort of 
person he is. 
8. A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian 
pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who 
built them. 
B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is 
best to stick to it. 
C. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
9. A. The world would be a much better place to live in if people 
would let the future take care of itself and concern them-
selves only with enjoying the present. 
B. It is wise to flatter important people. 
C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing 
it as new circumstances arise. 
10. A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things 
you do because you have no other choice. 
B. The biggest difference between most criminals and other 
people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught. 
C. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark of 
decency somewhere within him. 
11. A. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be 
important and dishonest. 
B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good 
chance of succeeding in whatever he wants to do. 
C. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn't 
very important. 
12. A. A person shouldn't be punished for breaking a law that he 
thinks is unreasonable. 
B. Too many criminals are not punished for their crimes. 
C. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
13. A. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they are 
B. 
c. 
forced to do so. 
Every person is entitled to a second 
commits a serious mistake. 
People who can't make up their minds 
ing about. 
chance, even after he 
are not worth bother-
~ 
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14. A. A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his mother. 
B. Most men are brave. 
C. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually stimul-
ating rather than ones it is comfortable to be around. 
15. A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning 
oneself about. 
B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and 
there. 
C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful 
to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one. 
16. A. It is best to give others the impression that you can 
change your mind easily. 
B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with 
everyone. 
C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
17. A. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
B. To help oneself is good; to help others is better. 
C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of life. 
18. A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there's at 
least one sucker born every minute. 
B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some 
excitement. 
C. Most people would be better off it they control their em-
otions. 
19. A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than 
poise in social situations. 
B. The ideal society is one where·everybody knows his place 
and accepts it. 
C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious 
streak and it will come out when they are given a chance. 
20. A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don 1 t know 
what they are talking about. 
B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for 
trouble. 
C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that 
everyone vote. 
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